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INTRODUCTION
6. The Internet is enabling conversations among human beings
that were simply not possible in the era of mass media.
7. Hyperlinks subvert hierarchy.
8. In both internetworked markets and among intranetworked
employees, people are speaking to each other in a powerful new
way.
9. These networked conversations are enabling powerful new
forms of social organization and knowledge exchange to emerge.
The Cluetrain Manifesto'
[T]he more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the
eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly
will the purpose X of the establishment have been attained. Ideal
perfection, if that were the object, would require that each per-
son should actually be in that predicament, during every instant
of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for
is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and
not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should con-
ceive himself to be so.
Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings2
One important aspect of Internet communications' value to society is
the zone of social and technical freedom that the Internet creates.' These
4
arguments assume that end users can treat the Internet as a cloud net-
I. CHRIS LOCKE, Doc SEARLS, & DAVID WEINBERGER, THE CLUETRAIN MANIFESTO,
at http://www.cluetrain.comt/#manifesto (April, 1999). The Cluetrain Manifesto consists of 95
"theses" which purport to describe and define the dynamics of a markets characterized by
non-hierarchical information flow.
2. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29-95 (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso
1995) (1787).
3. See supra note 1. Legal scholarship arguing for the transformational potential of
Internet communications includes LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER-
SPACE (Basic Books 1999) and Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the
Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998). Alter-
native theories that purport to explain the Internet's transformational potential are legion; they
lie, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
4. For purposes of this Note, the author will use the term "end user" to refer to a natu-
ral person who makes use of Internet communications facilities to communicate with another
natural person or automated instrumentality. This use of end user corresponds closely to the
term "user" or "user of the system or network" that appears in 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)-(d) (2002),
though section 512's definition does not exclude automated instrumentalities.
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work whose topology is so complex that the routes that information
takes are unimportant or at least unprofitable to worry about.5 They also
assume that communications over the Internet are unknowable in techni-
cal terms and legally shielded from routine monitoring. If these
assumptions are true, end users-citizens if one conceives of them as
political subjects, consumers in an economic sense-have the ability to
create social and technological communities that ignore physical and
network topology and to share information according to their desires.
This increase in the availability of information tends in the aggregate to
increase the efficiency of markets.
Direct control over communications over the Internet rests with the
Internet service providers (ISPs)6 who own the individual networks that,
in the aggregate, comprise the Internet. The effectiveness of this confed-
eration of networks rests on ISPs' decisions to adopt a particular suite of
standard networking protocols-Internet Protocol (IP) 7 and Transport
Control Protocol (TCP) are its highest-profile members-that allow end
users to be indifferent to the configuration of the networks between their
computers. IP, in particular, operates on the assumption that any com-
puter that receives a communication will forward that message to the
next computer on the route to its ultimate destination So far, partici-
pants in large IP networks have generally transmitted other participants'
messages without further examination of their source or content, exactly
5. For an early and authoritative description of this characteristic of the Internet, see A.
MARINE, J. REYNOLDS, AND G. MALKIN, RFC 1594, ANSWERS TO COMMONLY ASKED "NEW
INTERNET USER" QUESTIONS (1994), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfctrfcl 594.txt?number=- 1594
(characterizing Internet as "a collection of thousands of networks linked by a common set of
technical protocols which make it possible for users of any one of the networks to communi-
cate with or use the services located on any of the other networks. These protocols are referred
to as TCP/IP or the TCP/IP protocol suite.").
6. For purposes of this Note, the author will use the term "ISP" to refer to entities that
meet 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A)'s definition of service provider: "an entity offering the trans-
mission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to
the content of the material as sent or received*" The author will refer to entities that meet 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B)'s more generous definition-"provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor"-as "service providers." As 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(B) provides, all ISPs are therefore also service providers. The exposure of section
512(k)(1)(B) service providers to liability for their users' copyright infringement lies beyond
the scope of this Note.
7. This Note will use the acronym "IP" to refer to Internet Protocol as opposed to
intellectual property.
8. See, e.g., DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY (DARPA), RFC 791,
INTERNET PROTOCOL 2 (J. Postel, ed., 1981) available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc0791 .txt?number=0791 (describing the operation of IP networks connected by gateways or
routers that forward information from local network to local network).
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as if they were common carriers.9 This rule of universal mutual message
forwarding is essential to Internet end users' ability to create and use
sophisticated communications applications without concerning them-
selves with the details of the network routes that connect their
computers.0° Universal mutual message forwarding requires ISPs to act
more or less as common carriers; they forward messages without regard
for their origin, destination, or content.'1
Despite the fact that they generally behave as common carriers, ISPs
are not generally entitled to the blanket protection from liability for for-
warding others' messages granted to common carriers such as
telecommunications providers. 2 Instead, in the vital area of protection
from liability for users' copyright infringement, ISPs are subject to a
complex set of rules enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 512." These rules re-
quire courts to characterize the ISP's activities as (a) transmission or
routing, (b) system caching, (c) storage of material at a user's direction,
or (d) providing an information location tool in order to determine which
set of liability protections apply.4 The court's characterization of the
ISP's activity will also determine whether a copyright holder may serve
subpoenas under section 512(h) requiring the ISP to identify the user
who originated the allegedly infringing message as well as the extent of
injunctive relief available under section 512(j).' 5 A court's characteriza-
9. For an extensive discussion of the importance of the default rule that operators of
large IP networks will automatically forward messages passed to them by other operators of
large IP networks, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C.L. REv. 653, 655-
58 (providing general description of IP routing among operators of large IP networks).
10. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule of universal forwarding, but it is the
basic characteristic that defines the Internet. ISPs refer to refusal to forward communications
for a particular source as the "Internet death penalty" and reserve it for other ISPs who trans-
mit large amounts of unsolicited commercial email or other undesirable communications. See
THE JARGON LEXICON 4.3.3: INTERNET DEATH PENALTY, at http://jargon.watson-net.com/
jargon.asp?w=Internet+Death+Penalty (last visited September 20, 2002).
11. For further discussion of the common carrier doctrine, see discussion infra Part
I.B.ii.
12. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2002) (definition of common carrier in context of
telecommunications regulation); see also discussion infra Part I.B.ii. Note that because many
ISPs-BellSouth, MCI, SBC, AT & T, and Verizon, for example-are also full-blown com-
mon carriers with respect to their telecommunications activities, they will be subject to
different rules of liability depending on the nature of the traffic that flows over their lines. The
difficulties of reconciling the common carrier and ISP elements of these entities, especially
with the emergence of voice-over-IP technology, lie beyond the scope of this Note.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2002).
14. See id. § 512(a)-(d) (enumerating safe harbors from liability); see also discussion
infra Part II.A.
15. See id. § 512(h), (j) (enumerating requirements for subpoena requiring ISP to iden-
tify user who originated allegedly infringing material and limiting injunctive relief available
where ISP engaged in routing and transmission); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that section
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tion of an ISP's activity therefore determines whether the activity ex-
poses the ISP to liability and whether the identity of the other party is
easily discovered.
6
If a court characterizes the ISP's activity as transmission or routing,
the ISP is effectively shielded from direct and contributory liability for
its users' copyright infringement 7 and the copyright holder is not entitled
to a section 512(h) subpoena requiring the ISP to identify the alleged
offender.8 If the court characterizes the ISP's activity in any other way,
the ISP is exposed to contributory liability for its users' activities' 9 and
the copyright holder may serve a section 512(h) subpoena. 0 Courts have
not reached a consensus on how to characterize particular activities, and
the statute and its legislative history provide only limited guidance." In a
particularly important example of the difficulties that section 512's char-
acterization scheme raises, different courts have characterized ISP
participation in Usenet-a mutual message forwarding network detailed
infra in Part I.B.iii-as transmission and forwarding and as storage of
material at a user's direction. The courts' characterization of ISP par-
ticipation in Usenet decisively shaped the parties' options in later
litigation. 3 Courts' inconsistency in characterizing Usenet for section
512 purposes raises the possibility that courts may characterize other
mutual message-forwarding systems inconsistently, leaving ISPs uncer-
tain of their exposure to liability if they participate or allow their users to
participate in these systems.
If ISPs are exposed to liability for forwarding others' messages-
messages originating with other ISPs or with the ISP's own users-the
norm of universal mutual message forwarding that underlies the present
operation of the Internet will be threatened.4 This Note will argue that
512(h) subpoena unavailable where ISP acts as a mere conduit for transmission or routing but
available in other cases).
16. See discussion infra Parts H.A.vi, II.B.
17. Assuming that the ISP has met the threshold requirements for safe harbor contained
in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). For further development of this point, see discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.vi.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.vi.
20. See discussion infra Part ILA.vi.
21. See discussion infra Parts I.B, M.A.
22. Compare Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002), appeal
docketed, No. 02-55797 (9th Cir. argued Mar. 6, 2003), with ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Com-
munities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001). See also discussion infra Parts M.A.
23. See discussion infra Part M.A.
24. The norm of universal mutual message forwarding that characterizes the Internet is
already under threat from a number of technical and political developments, including the
extensive use of Network Address Translation (NAT) to conserve IP addresses, security filter-
ing, and non-US government regulation barring the use of particular applications, such as
Voice Over IP (VoIP or Internet telephony). See, e.g., David L. Margulius, Trouble on the Net,
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society presently confronts a choice between a common carrier Internet
characterized by universal mutual message forwarding and a monitored
and controlled Internet. Part I will describe the underlying rules that
govern ISPs' liability for their users' actions. Part II will argue that the
present statutory regime governing ISPs' liability for users' copyright
infringement includes elements that provide ISPs with substantial pro-
tection for mutual message forwarding and that this regime relies on
courts to characterize ISPs' activities to determine which liability stan-
dard applies. Part III will argue that courts have characterized one
particular networking activity-participating in the Usenet message-
forwarding system-inconsistently and that ISPs have not been able to
predict the degree to which forwarding Usenet messages exposes them
to liability. Part IV will argue that characterizing ISPs' activities so that
ISPs are exposed to secondary liability, obliged to comply with section
512(h) subpoenas, and denied section 512(j)(2)'s limits on injunctive
relief will undercut the norm of universal mutual message forwarding
that allows Internet communication and urge courts to characterize ISP
activity as transmission or routing protected by the section 512(a) safe
harbor to avoid these negative effects.25
I. THE DMCA COMPROMISE
The present regime governing ISPs' liability for copyright infringe-
ment on the part of their end users is defined in Title II of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 512.26 These provisions exist in the context of two important legal re-
gimes: the legal regime governing copyright infringement and the legal
regime governing electronic communications. Analyzing 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 independently of this broader context risks creating inconsisten-
cies between the regimes governing particular genera of electronic
communications. Part L.A will quickly summarize copyright infringe-
INFOWORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, at 40, 42-43. These technological and policy issues lie outside
the scope of this Note.
25. This Note will focus on the issues of direct and contributory liability for copyright
infringement and copyright holders' authority to issue section 512(h) subpoenas only; the
issue of vicarious liability, while extremely important to defining ISPs' comprehensive liabil-
ity exposure, will arise only in passing.
26. Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998). For a recent discussion of the liability regime created in the DMCA, see Raphael
Guiterrez, Save The Slip For The Service Providers: Courts Should Not Give Short Shrift To
The Safe Harbors Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F.L. REV. 907 (2002); for
a less serious, but more insightful, analysis, see also David Nimmer, Back from the Future: A
Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 855
(2001).
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ment doctrine. Part I.B will describe the legal regimes governing copy-
right infringement, electronic communications privacy and
communications service provider liability in general. Part I.B will also
argue that these overall norms shaped Congress's decision to provide
ISPs with robust protection from liability for forwarding others' mes-
sages in section 5 12(a).
A. Copyright Infringement and Liability
Under normal circumstances, anyone who violates an exclusive right
of a copyright holder is liable for copyright infringement. 27 The exclusive
rights of copyright holders include the right to reproduce a copyrighted
work, the right to distribute the work, the right to display the work pub-
licly, and the right to perform the work publicly.28 Any electronic
communication that includes unlicensed copyrighted works will violate
these exclusive rights. Routers and cache servers, for example, produce
reproductions of every packet they receive. Computer monitors must
display or perform a work for a user to view it.29
In addition, parties who materially contribute to infringement by an-
other with actual or constructive knowledge of that infringement will be
liable for contributory infringement.30 The consensus opinion of courts is
that ISPs who engage in passive, automatic copying of copyrighted
works incident to forwarding others' messages are not liable for direct
infringement." In the absence of statutory protection, however, ISPs may
be liable for contributory infringement where they have actual or con-
structive knowledge of the infringement, since their passive, automatic
copying qualifies as material contribution to infringement.32 Courts will
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (3)-(5) (2002).
29. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
creation of thumbnail images violates owner's reproduction right); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom, Inc., 907 F Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing reproduction of copies of
copyrighted works necessary to operation of Internet).
30. See Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 E3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
31. See Netcom, 907 F Supp. at 1372-73 (holding ISP not directly liable for passive,
automatic copying incident to forwarding others' messages); see also ALS Scan v. RemarQ
Communities, Inc., 239 F3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (following Netcom on issue of direct
infringement by ISP); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(following Netcom on issue of direct infringement by ISP); but see Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding BBS provider liable for passive,
automatic copying incident to forwarding users' messages).
32. See Netcom, 907 E Supp. at 1375 (holding that "[p]roviding a service that allows
for the automatic distribution of all Usenet postings, infringing and noninfringing" satisfies
material contribution element of contributory infringement); Ellison, 189 E Supp. 2d at 1058
(adopting Netcom conclusion that "[p]roviding a service that allows for the automatic
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not, however, impute constructive knowledge of infringement to the
manufacturer of a technology with substantial non-infringing uses based
on the capability of the technology to allow infringement.3
B. Privacy and Service Provider Liability in General
In general, electronic communications are accorded a high level of
protection from monitoring by the state or other interested private par-
ties.34 Also, telecommunications services are generally shielded from
liability for the communications that travel over their networks based on
their status as "common carriers."35 A common carrier is a service pro-
vider, such as a railroad, electric utility, or telecommunications provider,
which makes its facilities available to all comers and exercises limited
control over the use of its services.36 Common carriers are not liable for
the actions other parties take using their services."
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
(18 USC §§ 2510 et seq.)
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),38 initially
passed in 1968"9 and extensively revised in 1986, extends statutory pro-
distribution of all Usenet postings, infringing and noninfringing" when ISP has knowledge of
infringement constitutes contributory infringement).
33. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
34. See discussion infra Part I.B.i.
35. See generally Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, (N.Y 1974) (apply-
ing common carrier liability protection to telephone service provider); People v. Lauria, 251
Cal. App. 2d 471 (1967) (applying common carrier liability limitation to telephone answering
service).
36. See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. F C. C., 533 F.2d 601, 608--09
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which states:
[T]he primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character,
which arises out of the undertaking 'to carry for all people indifferently.' This does
not mean that the particular services offered must practically be available to the en-
tire public; a specialized carrier whose service is of possible use to only a fraction
of the population may nonetheless be a common carrier if he holds himself out to
serve indifferently all potential users. Nor is it essential that there be a statutory or
other legal commandment to serve indiscriminately; it is the practice of such indif-
ferent service that confers common carrier status. That is to say, a carrier will not be
a common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions in particu-
lar cases whether and on what terms to serve.
37. See discussion infra Part II.B.ii
38. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., including 2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-
26).
39. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 802, 82
Stat. 212 (1968).
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tection to the content of electronic communications. 40 ECPA protects all
"wire, oral, or electronic communication," including Internet communi-
cation over an ISP's cable and routers.4 ' ECPA places strict limits on
ISPs' ability to monitor and control their networks in order to preserve
the privacy of communications over those networks.42 ISPs-and all
other persons-are prohibited from interception and random monitoring
of the content of telephone and other electronic communications. Pro-
viders and their employees are subject to criminal liability if they
intercept, disclose, or use the content of any such communication except
in the course of providing service." Telecommunications providers, in-
cluding ISPs, may not engage in random monitoring except for quality
45
control purposes.
Similar, though less stringent, provisions cover disclosure of the
content of stored electronic communications, such as email messages
stored on an ISP's mail server. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) requires a warrant
issued by a magistrate before an ISP may disclose the contents of a sub-
scriber's stored communications to the government.46 ISPs need not
40. A full treatment of the intricacies of ECPA lies beyond the scope of this Note. The
limited treatment here does not fully address the "fog of inclusions and exclusions" created by
ECPA. Briggs v. Am. Air Filter, 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2002). ECPA uses "wire communication" to refer to conven-
tional telephone communication: "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for the transmission of communication by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection... " Id. § 2510(1).
42. See id. § 2511 (1) ("(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who- (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication......
43. Id.
44. See id. § 251 l(1)(a)-(c) (prohibiting interception, use, and disclosure).
45. Providers may disclose any information intercepted during routine monitoring. See
id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication ser-
vice, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary inci-
dent to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of
the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to
the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for me-
chanical or service quality control checks.
Id. (emphasis added). ISPs clearly fall within 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)'s definition of a provider
of electronic communication service: a provider of "any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." Id. § 2510(15).
46. See id. § 2703(a) ("A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider
of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication,
that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and
eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant .... ).
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disclose "record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber" be-
yond the subscriber's name, address, and payment arrangements without
a search warrant.4 7 ISPs may-but need not--disclose information about
subscribers, but not the content of their electronic communications, to
non-governmental entities. 4' These provisions preserve the confidential-
ity of electronic communications and reflect a strong societal interest in
protecting the privacy of electronic communications, though they serve
primarily to protect electronic communications against interception in
transit.
2. The Common Carrier Doctrine as Applied to
Telecommunications Providers and ISPs
These restrictions on telecommunications providers' freedom to
monitor communications reduce their ability to prevent infringing uses
of their networks. The limited control that conventional telecommunica-
tions providers may exercise over their subscribers has led Congress to
provide them with statutory protection from liability for copyright in-
fringement in cases where they have no control over the information
transmitted over their networks and do no more than provide transmis-
sion facilities.49 This statutory protection is closely analogous with the
liability protection courts have offered to other sorts of common carriers
under the common carrier doctrine. 0
The common carrier doctrine is available to ISPs as well as to
conventional telecommunications service providers. Congress and the
courts have applied the common carrier doctrine to ISPs in cases
involving defamation. In Cubby v. Compuserve,1 a court refused to
47. See id.
48. See id. § 2702(c)(5).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § I II(a)(3) (2002).
(a) The secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work embodied in
a primary transmission is not an infringement of copyright if...
(3) the secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or indirect
control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the particu-
lar recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to the
secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other commu-
nications channels for the use of others: Provided, That the provisions of this clause
extend only to the activities of said carrier with respect to secondary transmissions
and do not exempt from liability the activities of others with respect to their own
primary or secondary transmissions ....
Id.
50. Compare id. with Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. E C. C., 533 E2d
601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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impose liability on an ISP for statements a user had distributed in one of
its chat rooms.52 The court applied the common carrier doctrine in order
to prevent potential liability for defamation from imposing "an undue
burden on the free flow of information."53 Congress endorsed the court's
decision in the Communications Decency Act (CDA),54 which extends
statutory protection from liability for defamation where another party
originates the allegedly defamatory speech." In doing so, it explicitly
found that the diversity of political discourse on the Internet and the
unique opportunities for cultural development that it provided were
closely related to limited state and federal regulation of the medium.56
Courts have consistently applied the common carrier doctrine in post-
CDA defamation cases.57 In Zeran v. America Online, for example, the
Fourth Circuit explicitly mentioned Congress's findings in the CDA in
refusing to impose liability on an ISP for allegedly defamatory material
posted by a subscriber." The court noted that "[tihe imposition of tort
liability on service providers for the communications of others
represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive government
regulation of speech."59 Later courts have adopted the same rule,
52. See id. at 140. ("A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an
electronic news distributor such as CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library,
book store, or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information.").
53. Id.
54. Communications Decency Act of 1996 (DCA), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2002) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.").
56. See id. § 230(a), (b) (finding, inter alia, that "[t]he Internet and other interactive
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity:' that "[t]he Internet and
other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a
minimum of government regulation," and declaring the policy of the United States to be "to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation").
57. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 E3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Section
230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accord-
ingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum. In specific statutory
findings, Congress recognized the Internet and interactive computer services as offering 'a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.' "); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F Supp. 44, 49-50
(D.D.C. 1998) (applying 47 U.S.C. § 230 to shield service provider from liability for allegedly
defamatory gossip column); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F Supp. 2d 532, 537-38
(E.D. Va. 2003).
58. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
59. Id.
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shielding ISPs and other "provider[s] ... of ... interactive computer
service[s]" from liability for defamatory material posted by subscribers. 60
3. Pre-DMCA ISP Liability for Copyright Infringement
While courts were relatively uniform in their treatment of ISP liabil-
ity for defamation by users, no such uniformity emerged with respect to
ISP liability for users' copyright infringement. Before the passage of the
DMCA in 1998 created a statutory scheme governing service providers'
liability for users' copyright infringement, courts were divided in their
approaches.
One approach, typified by Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,6' found
ISPs directly liable for users' copyright infringement.62 In Frena, a local
BBS provider allowed paid subscribers to store graphics files on the
63BBS' computer. Other paid subscribers of the BBS could then transfer
copies of these graphics files to their own computers. 64 The opinion in-
cludes no information on whether the BBS forwarded communications
to other networks. 65 A subscriber of the BBS stored graphics files that
infringed plaintiff's copyrights on the BBS; other subscribers then
downloaded the files."6 The BBS played no role in selecting the files
stored on its equipment and took affirmative steps to disable access to
the files after receiving notice of the infringement, including policing
users' activities to prevent future infringement. During this course of
events, the BBS' equipment generated copies of the infringing material
incidental to its automated response to requests for the files initiated by
subscribers.68 Playboy brought suit against the BBS provider for copy-
right infringement, among other claims.69
The Frena court reasoned that generation of copies-at one's own
initiative or at the request of another party-sufficed to establish direct
copyright infringement; the BBS owner's intent to infringe and ability to
prevent infringement were irrelevant.70 The Frena court did not address
60. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52-53 (explicitly adopting Zeran court's analysis of
section 230); see also Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38 (explicitly adopting Zeran court's
analysis of section 230).
61. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
62. Id. at 1556.
63. Id. at 1554.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1556.
69. Id. at 1554.
70. See id. at 1559 ("It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of
the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not an element of infringement, and thus even
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the possibility that the BBS might qualify as a common carrier. As a
small, subscription-only service that did not forward messages for other
network providers, its claim to such status would have been weak at best.
The Frena approach became unworkable as the volume of messages
and later commerce that flowed over computer networks increased. A
legal regime in which every intermediate party involved in the automatic
forwarding of an infringing message was directly liable for copyright
infringement would impose crushing liability exposure on every major
ISP. For this reason, courts soon rejected the Frena approach for an ap-
proach that shielded ISPs from most liability. This approach, exemplified
by Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, Inc.,"' refused to find ISPs
directly liable for users' copyright infringement where the actual copying
resulted from the automatic functioning of the ISP's equipment, but left
open the possibility that the ISP might be contributorily liable if it "knew
of any infringement ... before it was too late to do anything about it.
72
In Netcom, Netcom, an ISP, provided Internet access to a bulletin board
system (BBS) operated by another party; this BBS provided its end users
with access to a Usenet server.13 The services Netcom provided to the
BBS included access to Netcom's Usenet server, which automatically
forwarded messages to other Usenet servers according to rules Netcom
defines7 4
Usenet is an automated system for distributing messages across the
Internet and, in some cases, other networks.75 These messages are organ-
ized according to several criteria:
Usenet... consists of a set of "newsgroups" with names that are
classified hierarchically by subject. "Articles" or "messages" are
"posted" to these newsgroups by people on computers with the
appropriate software-these articles are then broadcast to other
interconnected computer systems via a wide variety of net-
works.76
an innocent infringer is liable for infringement. ). Since the plaintiff had established direct
copyright infringement, the court did not address contributory liability.
71. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
72. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (refusing to impose direct liability on ISP for auto-
matic copying and transmission of plaintiff's copyrighted work at direction of user); id. at
1374.
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1367.
75. For a general discussion of Usenet, see WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usenet (last updated Dec 3, 2003); for a slightly outdated but
still valuable discussion of Usenet and Usenet culture, see Mark Moraes, What is Usenet?, at
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/usenet/what-is/partl/ (last updated Jan 16, 1998).
76. Netcom, 907 F Supp. at 1367.
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Usenet, with its decentralized administrative structure, worldwide
end user community, and strong cultural traditions of anarchic independ-
ence includes newsgroups ranging from the harmless oddity of
alt.swedish.chef.bork.bork.bork to the serial-killer-fan discussion of
alt.fan.karla-homolka to channels for distribution of obscene and illegal
images like the cryptically-named alt.binaries.adolescents.off-topic."
Usenet servers forward messages to each other according to rules es-
tablished on every server; some servers refuse messages from particular
newsgroups, by particular authors, in particular hierarchies, or based on
other criteria.78 Each server has a set of rules defined by its owner and
accepts and forwards messages based on those rules. The process is
automated in that humans set the rules for forwarding and accepting
messages; the application of the rules is left to the automated instrumen-
tality of the server.
Servers retain only a single copy of each message and distribute it to
end users on demand. This method of distributing messages reduces the
amount of network capacity that Usenet servers and end users consume
in distributing messages throughout the network of Usenet servers.
Usenet servers retain end users' messages for a period of time de-
termined by the local system administrator. Because of the high volume
of traffic on Usenet, most system administrators limit retention of mes-
sages to two weeks or less. Newsgroups that generate a high volume of
data-especially those in which binary files such as compiled computer
programs or graphics files-will often have shorter retention periods.
Some Usenet servers will have longer retention periods, ranging up to
the indefinite retention period of Usenet archives such as Google
Groups.7 9
Many ISPs maintain Usenet servers for their subscribers. Some Use-
net servers have particularly permissive rules; these servers will often
charge a separate fee for access. End users gain access to Usenet by con-
necting to a server using a client program. Such client programs are
called "newsreaders." End users generally do not participate in Usenet
by hosting a server themselves.
77. Usenet's decentralized structure makes it effectively impossible to create a definitive
list of existing groups. For a sample list of the 10,635 groups in the alt hierarchy carried by
UUNet, a major ISP, as of Feb. 23, 2000, see http://www.itc.virginia.edu/-rlbOp/uunet.alt.txt.
78. For a full discussion of the categories of information that may be used to differenti-
ate among Usenet messages, see Memorandum from M. Horton & R. Adams, RFC 1036-
Standard for Interchange of USENET Messages, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1036.txt (last
visited April 15, 2004).
79. Google Groups' Usenet archive is available at http://groups.google.com.
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In Netcom, an end user of the BBS infringed the Religious Technol-
ogy Center's (RTC's) copyrights by calling into the BBS and posting a
message containing copyrighted texts including secrets of the Church of
Scientology to its Usenet server.0 The BBS' Usenet server then auto-
matically forwarded the message to Netcom's Usenet server." Netcom's
Usenet server, in turn, automatically forwarded the message to other
Usenet servers before deleting it. 2 The infringing end user had no con-
tractual relationship with Netcom. 3
RTC informed both the BBS and Netcom of the end user's infringing
activity but neither party took action to stop him; Netcom claimed that it
lacked sufficiently fine-grained control over its network to stop a single
end user's messages.4 RTC then filed a complaint claiming that Netcom
was liable for the end user's copyright infringement on both direct and
contributory theories.85
The Netcom court found that Netcom was not directly liable for
copyright infringement on the part of the end user because it had not ini-
tiated the copying: "the mere fact that Netcom's system incidentally
makes temporary copies of plaintiffs' works does not mean Netcom has
caused the copying."86 Under these circumstances, the court found that
Netcom had acted "like a conduit" in that it forwarded messages at the
direction of another.17 The court, however, explicitly declined to extend
the common carrier doctrine to ISPs8' and therefore left them open to
contributory liability.
89
The court's contributory liability analysis focuses almost entirely on
the knowledge element because the automated copying of the infringing
material, while not sufficient to establish direct liability, was sufficient to
satisfy the material contribution element of contributory liability.90 The
80. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
81. Id. at 1367 (outlining chain of transmission of end user's messages).
82. Id. (noting that Netcom retained the message for eleven days).
83. Id. at 1367-68.
84. Id. at 1366.
85. Id. (Plaintiff's claim included the end user and BBS as defendants in addition to
Netcom.)
86. Id. at 1369.
87. Id. at 1372.
88. See id. at 1369 n.12 (extensively discussing common carrier doctrine and conclud-
ing that ISPs are not common carriers because they provide more than "the wire and conduits"
for the infringing activity and 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(a)(3) explicitly limits common carrier protec-
tion to entities that satisfy both that condition and also exercise no control over the content of
the communications over their networks).
89. See id. at 1373 (holding that Netcom may be liable for contributory infringement).
90. See id. at 1375 (holding that forwarding potentially-infringing messages "goes well
beyond" satisfying material contribution element of contributory liability).
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court treats knowledge of infringement and the ability to prevent the in-
fringement as if they are identical-an assumption that may not have
been justified given the prevailing standard of technology at the time but
may be more justified now." The court concluded that an ISP will be
contributorily liable for copyright infringement initiated by a user when
it "[knows] of any infringement ... before it was too late to do anything
about it."92 The court appears to have assumed the ISPs would not, in
fact, be subject to contributory liability, since the prevailing technology
did not allow fine-grained knowledge of traffic patterns:
Billions and billions of bits of data flow through the Internet and
are necessarily stored on servers throughout the network and it is
thus practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from
noninfringing bits. Because the court cannot see any meaningful
distinction (without regard to knowledge) between what Netcom
did and what every other Usenet server does, the court finds that
Netcom cannot be held liable for direct infringement.93
While the court is addressing the issue of direct infringement, its as-
sumption that ISPs will not be able to identify and stop infringing
activity makes it extremely unlikely that any ISP operating under the
then-prevailing technological standard would ever know of infringement
"before it was too late to do anything about it." If an ISP can never "do
anything about it," knowledge of infringement will always arrive too
late. Despite its refusal to adopt the common carrier doctrine directly, the
Netcom standard, with its combination of a "conduit" protection from
direct liability and limited knowledge and control as a shield against
contributory liability, provided ISPs with protection from direct and con-
tributory liability for users' copyright infringement. Courts tended to
follow Netcom and refuse to impose direct or contributory liability with-
out some level of knowledge of infringement or intent to infringe on the
part of the ISP.
94
91. See, e.g., id. at 1372 (noting that "no purpose would be served by holding liable
those who have no ability to control the information to which their subscribers have access");
id. at 1374 (noting in discussion of knowledge element that Netcom "retains some control
over the use of [its] system").
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1372-73.
94. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-14
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (citing Netcom approvingly, but finding defendant liable because he became
,active participant' in infringement by inducing subscribers to upload copyrighted works onto
its system and exercising editorial control over content); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. NAFED and
Northwest Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. I11. 1997) (citing Netcom approvingly,
and finding web hosting service that stored infringing material not liable because it "only
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II. TITLE II OF THE DMCA: STATUTORY
SAFE HARBOR FOR ISPs
Faced with the conflicting results in Netcom and Frena, ISPs and
representatives of copyright holders pushed for Congressional legislation
to define ISPs' liability for infringement on the part of their subscribers.
Congress responded to this pressure with Title II of the DMCA. Con-
gress held extensive hearings during drafting of the DMCA and in its
final form the legislation enjoyed wide support.9 Title II of the DMCA,
defining the limits of liability protection-the "safe harbors" from liabil-
ity-for ISPs and other entities that provide services over the Internet, is
embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 512.96 Congress substantially extended the Net-
corn court's rejection of strict liability for direct infringement and
refused to hold ISPs liable for copyright infringement incident to their
role as conduits for other ISPs' and end users' messages. 9 Part II.A will
argue that the text, structure, and legislative history of section 512's limi-
tations of liability for service providers prove that Congress intended to
give ISPs a blanket safe harbor from liability for forwarding others' mes-
sages. Part II.B will argue that, in their entirety, section 512's provisions
extend substantial protection from liability to ISPs whose activities fall
into the section 512(a) transmission and routing safe harbor. Part lI.C
will argue that Congress considered and rejected the option of merely
codifying existing case law.
A. Extending Netcom: Section 512's Safe Harbors
In Title II of the DMCA, Congress created a series of four safe har-
bors-particular categories of conduct for which properly-qualified
service providers will not be liable for direct, contributory, or vicarious
provided the means to copy, distribute or display plaintiff's works, much like the owner of a
public copying machine used by a third party to copy protected material").
95. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 9 (1998) (noting unanimous support for DMCA in
Judiciary Committee and broad support from concerned interest groups).
96. For general discussion of section 512's provisions, see Jonathan Band & Matthew
Schruers, Safe Harbors Against The Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act
And The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295 (2002); Jona-
than A. Friedman, Esq. & Francis M. Buono, Esq., Using The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act To Limit Potential Copyright Liability Online, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 18 (2000).
97. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (noting that "it does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of
countless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating
a system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet"), with S. REP. No. 105-190, at
8-9 (1998) (noting the ISPs "must make innumerable electronic copies by simply transmitting
information over the Internet"). See also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2002).
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infringement.98 Congress intended these safe harbors neither to increase
nor to decrease service providers' underlying exposure to liability, but
only to shield them from monetary remedies for particular acts on the
part of their end users or other service providers." Congress intended to
preserve incentives for both service providers and copyright owners to
"detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digi-
tal networked environment.,' ''°
To meet these expansive and potentially contradictory goals, Con-
gress created a complex, nested network of safe harbors that shield
service providers from liability where the service provider:
1. transmits digital communications across digital networks,
(section 5 12(a))' ' or
2. retains previously-transmitted digital information in tempo-
rary storage (section 512(b)), 10 2 or
3. stores material on its systems or networks at the direction of a
103
user (section 512(c)), or
4. refers or links users to infringing material (section 512(d)).'04
The safe harbor approach requires courts to characterize a service
provider's allegedly infringing activity before it can determine its expo-
sure to liability, the availability of subpoenas to identify an alleged
infringer, or the limits imposed on injunctive relief.05
i. Threshold Requirements for all
Section 512 Safe Harbors
To qualify for safe harbor under any of these provisions, a service
provider must "adopt and reasonably implement" a policy that allows it
98. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19, 20 (1998) (noting Congressional intent to allow
development of service provider liability law, despite creation of categories of subscriber con-
duct for which service providers are preserved from liability and also noting that safe harbors
shield service provider from liability for all monetary relief for direct, contributory, and vi-
carious infringement). The safe harbor liability protection provisions are extremely complex;
the following exposition of its features, while extensive, is necessary to capture the complex
interdependencies of its provisions.
99. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19, 20 (noting Congressional intent enumeration of
safe harbors does not imply expansion or contraction of underlying liability).
100. Id. at 20.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2002); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 41-42.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 42-43.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 43-47.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47-49.
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (h), (j).
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to terminate access to its networks and systems for repeat infringers.' °6
Each of the safe harbors requires that a service provider meet a number
of additional criteria specific to that safe harbor before availing itself of
liability protection.
ii. Requirements for Section 512(a) Safe Harbor
The section 512(a) safe harbor applies only to parties that meet sec-
tion 512(k)(1)(A)'s definition of service provider: "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of mate-
rial of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the
material as sent or received."' 7 Section 512(a) shields ISPs that meet
section 512(k)(1)(A)'s definition from monetary liability where they use
automated means to forward communications originating with other
ISPs or dispatched by their own users without altering the content of the
communications.'8 The statute expressly rejects the holding in Frena and
shields ISPs from monetary remedies for making "intermediate and tran-
sient [infringing] copies of the information [transmitted] between routers
and servers" during its transmission from end user to end user.109
The section 512(a) safe harbor closely resembles statutory and
common-law liability protection for common carriers in that ISPs may
not avail themselves of the section 512(a) safe harbor if they play "an
editorial function of determining what material to send, or the specific
sources of material to place online ... rather than 'an automatic techni-
cal process' of responding to a command or request, such as one from a
user, an Internet location tool, or another network*"" 0 Congress intended
to apply a very broad definition of "editorial function," indicating that
service providers who merely selected "the specific sources of material
to place online (e.g., a radio station)" would qualify as exercising an edi-
torial function and would therefore not qualify for section 512(a) safe
harbor."' Section 512(a)'s safe harbor was intended to cover all catego-
ries of communications en route from a user to another user; so long as
the ISP automatically transmits messages selected and dispatched by
106. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A). Section 512(i)(1)(B) imposes the requirement that service
providers accommodate and not interfere with standard technical measures to protect copy-
righted works. These standard technical measures have not, as yet, materialized.
107. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
108. See id. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
109. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 41 (1998).
110. Id. at 42; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2),(3), (5) (enumerating requirements that
service provider seeking section 512(a) safe harbor select neither the recipients of the commu-
nication nor the content of the communication).
111. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 42 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2)).
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another person-a user or another network operator-without alteration
or selection of the content and does not retain copies of the communica-
tion, it will not be liable for monetary damages.'
2
Section 512(a) includes no knowledge element; ISPs that meet the
section 512(k)(1)(A) definition and satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 512(a)(1 )-(5) will qualify for its safe harbor regardless of their state
of knowledge regarding the communications."3 Under section 512(a), so
long as an ISP "plays the role of a 'conduit' for the communications of
others," it will not be liable for monetary damages for direct, contribu-
tory, or vicarious infringement.' 4 The section 512(a) safe harbor,
therefore, extends ISPs' protection from monetary liability for users' ac-
tions beyond the limits of the Netcom rule."5
iii. Requirements for Section 512(b) Safe Harbor
Section 512(b) shields any organization that meets section
512(k)(1)(B)'s generous definition of "service provider"-"a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities there-
for"" 6-from monetary liability for creating intermediate copies of
infringing material in a local cache server."7 So long as the automatic
112. See discussion supra; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
114. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 41; see also id. at 40 (noting that safe harbors embodied in
sections 512(a)-(d) "protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief
for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement").
115. Compare id. at 40 with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F Supp. 1361,
1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that Netcom may be liable for contributory infringement).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(l)(B) (2002). Courts have interpreted this definition very
broadly; there are, as yet, no decisions which set its limits. eBay, USENET news providers,
and AVS providers have all been included within this definition. See Hendrickson v. Ebay,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D.Cal. 2001) ("eBay clearly meets the DMCA's broad
definition of online 'service provider.'"); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities,
Inc., 239 F3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that USENET news provider meets section
512(k)(1)(B) definition); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F Supp. 2d 1146,
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that AVS provider will be treated as section 512(k)(l)(B)
service provider for summary judgment purposes).
117. A full discussion of caching is beyond the scope of this Note. Network caching
allows a service provider to maximize the efficiency of its low-capacity network link (such as
an upstream connection to the Internet) by placing a cache server on the downstream side of
the link. When a user of the service provider's network requests a particular item for the first
time, the service provider's network will retrieve it for the user over the low-capacity link. The
cache server will retain a copy of the item. When another user requests the same item, the
service provider's network will deliver the copy stored in cache instead of retrieving the origi-
nal copy-thus avoiding use of the low-capacity link and reducing the service provider's total
cost of maintaining its upstream connectivity. In situations where many users request the same
items, caching can substantially reduce service providers' connectivity costs. For additional
discussion of network caching, see, for example, White Paper from Cisco Systems, Network
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storage and transmission of material on the cache server is initiated by
other persons and the service provider neither interferes with copyright
management tools nor alters the content of the stored material, the ser-
vice provider is shielded from monetary liability for infringement."8
Section 512(b) includes a very limited knowledge element. In order
to qualify for its safe harbor, service providers must remove or disable
access to material stored in a network cache if:
1. they receive a formal notice that infringing material is stored
on their network cache," 9 and
2. access to the original source of the infringing material has
been disabled,' 20 and
3. the formal notice includes a statement that access to the origi-
nal source has been disabled.
2
'
Section 512(b) requires no action of service providers unless they
receive a notice complying with the requirements above.'22
iv. Requirements for Section 512(c) Safe Harbor
Congress intended section 512(c) to shield service providers-
defined according to section 512(k)(1)(B)'s generous standard-from
monetary liability for "direct, vicarious and contributory infringement
for storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system
or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider."' 23 The
safe harbor applies in any "forum in which material may be posted at the
direction of users."'24 Congress provides a list of examples of services
that qualify for section 512(c) safe harbor-"providing server space for a
user's web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in which material may be
posted at the direction of users"-that indicates that it intended section
512(c) to cover a very wide range of services. 21
Service providers must comply with a number of procedural formali-
ties--over and above section 512(i) threshold requirements for all of
Caching (2000), available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/cxsr/00/tech/cds-
wp.pdf.
118. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1), (2)(A)-(D) (2002); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 42-
43 (1998) (discussing requirements for section 512(b) safe harbor).
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E). For details of formal notifications of infringing activ-
ity, see discussion of section 512(c)(3) notifications infra Part II.A.iv.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i).
121. See id. § 512(b)(2)(E)(ii).
122. See id. § 512(b)(2)(E).
123. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 43 (1998); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
124. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 43.
125. Id.
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section 512's safe harbors-to qualify for section 512(c) protection.
They must appoint an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringe-
ment and provide contact information for the agent to the Register of
Copyrights.' 26 They must act expeditiously to disable access to infringing
material on receipt of a notice of claimed infringement.12 They must also
take steps to assist any party that provides a designated agent a defective
notice of claimed infringement to bring the notice into compliance with
the requirements of section 5 12(c)(3)(A). 28
Section 512(c), like the Netcom standard, includes a substantial and
explicit knowledge element.'29 A service provider must remove or disable
access to any infringing material on its network once it acquires actual or
constructive knowledge of the material or activity using the material.130
Constructive knowledge is broadly defined for purposes of section
512(c) as awareness of "facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent."' 3 ' Congress provides no examples of what sort of
"facts or circumstances" would allow imputation of constructive
knowledge of infringement to a service provider beyond stating that "if
the service provider becomes aware of a 'red flag' from which infringing
activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no
action." The red flag test for constructive knowledge has both
subjective and objective elements.' The subjective element is subjective
knowledge of the facts defined as a red flag on the part of the service
provider."' The objective element is the definition of those facts; a red flag
is any indication that would make infringing activity apparent to a
reasonable person operating under similar circumstances.'35 Section 512(c)
imposes a duty on service providers to disable access to any material they
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). A detailed discussion of the contradictory intrica-
cies of the section 512(c)(3) notice process is beyond the scope of this Note
129. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(i)-(ii), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that Netcom will be exposed to contributory
liability if it had knowledge of user's infringement).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(i)-(iii); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44 (1998)
(noting that expeditious removal of material on acquiring actual or constructive knowledge
necessary to preserve liability protection).
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
132. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44 (1998).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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actually know to be infringing or which passes the red flag test in order
to preserve their safe harbor.1
36
Under these circumstances, a service provider's knowledge of in-
fringing activity may expand in three ways:
1. its actual knowledge of infringing activity on its network will
expand as its agents gain information about infringing mate-
rial present on the network;137 and
2. its subjective constructive knowledge will expand as its
agents gain information about communications traffic on its
network;'38 and
3. its objective constructive knowledge will expand as "reason-
able persons" gain information about the patterns of user
conduct and traffic that make infringing activity apparent.1
39
Together, these three aspects of the knowledge element of section
512(c) safe harbor expose service providers to a rapid expansion of their
level of knowledge, actual and constructive, of infringement and thus to
a dimunition of the extent of activity covered by the safe harbor.
The knowledge elements of section 512(c) coexist uncomfortably
with Congress's intention to impose no duty on ISPs and other service
providers affirmatively to police their networks for infringing material:
"[A] service provider need not monitor its service or affirmatively seek
facts indicating infringing activity ... in order to claim this limitation on
liability (or, indeed any other limitation provided by this legislation).' 40
Congress's intention is embodied in section 512(m)(1), which explicitly
states that none of the safe harbor provisions shall be construed to re-
quire "monitoring [of] service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating
infringing activity."'
4
'1
v. Requirements for Section 512(d) Safe Harbor
Section 512(d) shields service providers-again, defined broadly
according to section 512(k)(1)(B)-from monetary liability for
copyright infringement for linking users to an Internet location
136. See id. at 45 ("A service provider wishing to benefit from the limitation on liability
under subsection (c) must 'take down' or disable access to infringing material residing on its
system or network of which it has actual knowledge or that meets the 'red flag' test, even if
the copyright owner or its agent does not notify it of a claimed infringement.").
137. See discussion supra note 129 and accompanying text.
138. See discussion supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. See discussion supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2002).
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142containing infringing material. This safe harbor covers a broad range
of activity, from the creation of directory services and search engines to
hypertext linking. 1
43
The section 512(d) safe harbor is subject to the same knowledge
elements as section 512(c).'44 A service provider that gains actual or con-
structive knowledge of infringing material or activity must "remove, or
disable access to" the material to preserve its section 512(d) safe har-
bor. 45 The service provider must also respond to notifications of claimed
infringement by disabling access to allegedly infringing material.
4 6
While Congress does not discuss in detail the level of actual or con-
structive knowledge required to disqualify a service provider from
protection under section 512(c), it discusses the level of knowledge re-
quired to defeat a claim to section 512(d) protection extensively.' 47
Because Congress provides so little guidance on the standard for estab-
lishing actual or constructive knowledge under section 512(c), its
remarks regarding the knowledge standard imposed in section 512(d) are
worth quoting at length:
Like the information storage safe harbor in section 512(c), a ser-
vice provider would qualify for [the section 512(d)] safe harbor
if, among other requirements, it 'does not have actual knowledge
that the material or activity is infringing' or, in the absence of
such actual knowledge, it is 'not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.' Under this standard,
a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copy-
right infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if
it had turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of obvious infringement.
142. See id. § 512(d).
143. See id; see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 ("The term information location tools
includes, for example: a directory or index of online sites or material such as a search engine
that identifies pages by specified criteria, a reference to other online material such as a list of
recommended sites, a pointer that stands for an Internet location or address, or a hypertext link
which allows users to access material without entering its address.").
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(C); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (describing
duty of service provider to remove infringing material on acquiring actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (noting correspon-
dence between notice provisions of section 512(c) and (d)). Oddly, section 512(d) includes no
requirement that a service provider appoint an agent to receive notifications of alleged in-
fringement. No case law has yet addressed the question of whether a service provider may
avail itself of the section 512(d) safe harbor without appointing an agent.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(l)(A); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47.
147. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 48-49.
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For instance, the copyright owner could show that the provider
was aware of facts from which infringing activity was apparent
if the copyright owner could prove that the location was clearly,
at the time the directory provider viewed it, a 'pirate' site of the
type described below, where sound recordings, software, movies
or books were available for unauthorized downloading, public
performance or public display. Absent such 'red flags' or actual
knowledge, a directory provider would not be similarly aware
merely because it saw one or more well known photographs of a
celebrity at a site devoted to that person. The provider could not
be expected, during the course of its brief cataloguing visit, to
determine whether the photograph was still protected by copy-
right or was in the public domain; if the photograph was still
protected by copyright, whether the use was licensed; and if the
use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair use
doctrine.
The important intended objective of this standard is to exclude
sophisticated 'pirate' directories-which refer Internet users to
other selected Internet sites where pirate software, books, mov-
ies, and music can be downloaded or transmitted-from the safe
harbor. Such pirate directories refer Internet users to sites that
are obviously infringing because they typically use words such
as 'pirate,' 'bootleg,' or slang terms in their uniform resource lo-
cator (URL) and header information to make their illegal
purpose obvious to the pirate directories and other Internet users.
Because the infringing nature of such sites would be apparent
from even a brief and casual viewing, safe harbor status for a
provider that views such a site and then establishes a link to it
would not be appropriate. Pirate directories do not follow the
routine business practices of legitimate service providers prepar-
ing directories, and thus evidence that they have viewed the
infringing site may be all that is available for copyright owners
to rebut their claim to a safe harbor.
In this way, the 'red flag' test in section 512(d) strikes the right
balance. The common-sense result of this 'red flag' test is that
online editors and catalogers would not be required to make dis-
criminating judgments about potential copyright infringement.
If, however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it
may be all that is needed for the service provider to encounter a
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'red flag.' A provider proceeding in the face of such a red flag
must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.'
48
Congress intended that mere awareness on the part of the ISP or its
agent of activity or material-without knowledge of its infringing na-
ture-not suffice to deprive the provider of the section 512(d) -safe
harbor.149 Congress did not assume that ISPs were experts in copyright
law and therefore refused to impute to them the ability to measure the
infringing character of particular activities in the absence of a glaring
"red flag."'"5 Congress's goal in limiting the extent of constructive
knowledge was to preserve human-compiled search engines from secon-
dary liability imposed on the sole basis of a single cataloging visit. 5'
At the same time, Congress provided indications that providing ac-
cess to obviously infringing material would be sufficient, under some
circumstances, to establish constructive knowledge and defeat the ISP's
section 512(d) safe harbor.'5 2 If the ISP links a user to a "pirate site," the
copyright holder will be able to establish the ISP had at least construc-
tive knowledge of copyright infringement. 53 Beyond enumerating some
patterns of conduct associated with "pirate sites" like using the strings
"pirate" or "bootleg" in their URLs and distributing obviously unli-
censed copyright material, Congress provides no guidance on the
boundary between a "pirate site"-viewing which will deprive an ISP of
its section 512(d) safe harbor-and an infringing but non-pirate site-
which an ISP may safely view without sacrificing its protection from
liability.
'
11
vi. Section 512(h) Infringer-Identification Subpoenas
Section 512(h) allows a copyright owner or its authorized agent to
seek a subpoena requiring a service provider to identify an alleged in-
fringer without filing a claim against the infringer."' In order for the
148. See id.
149. See id. at 49.
150. Id. at 48.
151. See id. at 49 (1998) (discussing value to Internet user of human-compiled search
engines like Yahoo! and interest in preserving human editorial role to reduce exposure to "ir-
relevant and offensive material").
152. See id. at 48 (1998) (discussing plaintiffs' ability to establish constructive knowl-
edge by showing ISP's awareness of "red flags" or "pirate sites").
153. See id.
154. Congress's notion of a "pirate site" appears to correspond closely to "warez"
sites, which distribute unlicensed versions of commercial software or provides easy access
to locations where such software is available. See, e.g., http://www.warez.com/;
http://www.easydownloads.net/.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2002).
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subpoena to issue, the copyright owner must submit a copy of the notifi-
cation it has provided--or will provide-to the service provider under
section 512(c)(3)(A), a copy of the proposed subpoena, and a declaration
attesting to its good faith in seeking the alleged infringer's identity.'56 If
all of the owners' materials are in order, Congress intended that "the is-
suing of the order should be a ministerial function performed quickly."'
157
Congress also intended that section 512(h) infringer-identification sub-
poenas would only be available to copyright owners "who have
submitted or will submit a ... notification satisfying the requirements of
subsection (c)(3)(A).' ' 6
Since section 512(a) has no knowledge element in determining an
ISP's monetary liability and makes no reference to notification at all
while section 512(b), (c), and (d) include a knowledge element and refer
to notification, Congress did not intend section 512(h) to authorize sub-
poenas where an ISP is engaged in transmission or routing of others'
messages.' 9 The only Federal appellate court that has addressed the issue
adopted this analysis, holding that section 512(h) infringer-identification
subpoenas are not available where an ISP's activity is protected by the
section 512(a) safe harbor.'6°
vii. Section 512(j) Limitations on Injunctive Relief
While section 512(a)-(d) limits service providers' monetary liability
for copyright infringement, section 5120) limits the scope of injunctive
relief available to copyright holders. 6' If an ISP qualifies for the section
512(a) transmission and routing safe harbor, injunctive relief is limited to
suspension of a "subscriber or account holder['s]" access to the ISP's
network or reasonable steps to block access to a "specific, identified,
online location outside the United States.' 62 Congress appears to have
intended that injunctive relief in section 512(a) situations would be
available only to ISPs which had a direct contractual relationship with
the infringing end user, since other ISPs in the web of mutual message
156. Id. § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C).
157. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 51.
158. Id.
159. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) with section 512(b)-(d); see also discussion supra Part
II.B.
160. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1237 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2003) (noting that cross-references to section 512(c)(3)(A) notifica-
tion provisions in sections 512(b) and (d) and lack of such cross references in section 512(a)
support conclusion that section 512(h) subpoenas unavailable for activity covered by section
512(a) safe harbor).
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
162. See id. § 512(j)(1)(B).
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forwarding will not have a subscription relationship with the end user
and will therefore have no account to terminate.
63
If the section 512(b), (c), or (d) safe harbors apply, the court's power
to grant injunctive relief is less limited.' 64 The court may order the ser-
vice provider to suspend a subscriber's access to its services or to
prevent access to "a particular online site on the provider's system or
network."' 65 The court may also impose any other injunctive relief it con-
siders necessary, if these steps are "the least burdensome to the service
provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that pur-
pose."166
However the court characterizes the ISP's activity, it must take the
following four factors into account in shaping injunctive relief:
(A) whether such an injunction, either alone or in combination
with other such injunctions issued against the same service pro-
vider under this subsection, would significantly burden either the
provider or the operation of the provider's system or network;
(B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suffered by the copy-
right owner in the digital network environment if steps are not
taken to prevent or restrain the infringement;
(C) whether implementation of such an injunction would be
technically feasible and effective, and would not interfere with
access to noninfringing material at other online locations; and
(D) whether other less burdensome and comparably effective
means of preventing or restraining access to the infringing mate-
rial are available.'
67
These factors require the court to balance the ISP's interest in effi-
cient operation of its networks-factors (A), (C), and (D)-against the
potential harm the copyright owner may suffer-factor (B).168 Research
163. See id. Congress makes the same assumption of a contractual relationship between
the end user in Senate Report 190. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 53 (1998) (observing that
injunctive relief available when ISP activity covered by section 512(a) safe harbor limited to
"an order to the service provider to terminate subscriber accounts that are specified in the
order").
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A).
165. See id. § 512(j)(l)(A)(i), (ii).
166. See id. § 512(j)(l)(A)(iii).
167. Id. § 5120)(2).
168. See id..
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reveals no court that has yet addressed the implications of these limita-
tions on injunctive relief.169
B. The Section 512 Safe Harbor Provisions as a Whole
Taken in its entirety, section 512 creates a complex scheme of statu-
tory safe harbors from liability for service providers:
(1) SECTION 512(A) SAFE HARBOR FOR ISP MESSAGE FORWARDING:
ISPs and other network connectivity providers are entitled to a safe har-
bor from monetary liability analogous to common carrer protection for
the automatic transmission of messages regardless of their knowledge of
the content of the messages. 17 In addition, section 512(h) infringer-
identification subpoenas are unavailable and section 5120) limits injunc-
tive relief to termination of a subscriber's account or suspension of
access to a network resource outside U.S. jurisdiction. 7'
(2) SECTION 512(B) SAFE HARBOR FOR NETWORK CACHING: All ser-
vice providers are entitled to safe harbor from monetary liability for
local caching of material to facilitate efficient distribution regardless of
their knowledge of the content of the material, so long as they abide by
minimal notification requirements.' Section 512(h) subpoenas are avail-
able and only section 5120)(1)(A)'s limits on injunctive relief apply.'
(3) SECTION 512(c) SAFE HARBOR FOR USER-DIRECTED STORAGE: All
service providers are entitled to safe harbor from liability for storing
material at the direction of a user so long as they have neither actual nor
constructive knowledge of user's infringement and abide by the
notification requirements of section 512(c)(1)(c). 174 Section 512(c)
corresponds closely with the rule enunciated in Netcom because it
shields an ISP from direct liability for forwarding messages that infringe
copyright but leaves open the possibility that ISP may be a contributory
infringer if it had actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement.'
169. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1235
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2003), appears to be the only discussion of section 512(j) in any published
Federal decision. The court makes reference to section 512(j)(l)(A)'s distinction between
"providing access to material" and "terminating the account of [a] subscriber" to support its
conclusion that no notification of claimed infringement delivered by a copyright owner to an
ISP engaged in section 512(a) transmission or routing can substantially meet the requirements
of section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which requires such notifications to include sufficient information
to allow the ISP to disable access to the material. Id.
170. See discussion supra Part II.A.ii.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (h), (j); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
172. See discussion supra Part II.A.iii.
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (h), (j); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.iv.
175. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
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As with section 512(b), section 512(h) subpoenas are available and
section 5120)( 1)(A)'s limits on injunctive relief apply.76
(4) SECTION 512(D) SAFE HARBOR FOR INFORMATION LOCATION
TOOLS: All service providers are entitled to safe harbor from liability for
providing an index or other link to infringing material so long as they
have neither actual nor constructive knowledge of infringing nature of
the material and abide by the notification requirements of section
512(d)(1)(c). 7 7 As with sections 512(b) and (d), section 512(h) subpoe-
nas are available and section 512(j)(1)(A)'s limits on injunctive relief
apply.
7 8
The section 512(a) safe harbor, as demonstrated above, is easily the
most robust. It includes no knowledge element in assessing monetary
liability, shields the ISP from section 512(h) subpoenas, and limits in-
junctive relief, in practical terms, to termination of a subscriber's
account. 79 The other safe harbors are substantially less safe: a service
provider may be monetarily liable if it has actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, section 512(h) subpoenas are available,
and courts have broad discretion in shaping injunctive relief for copy-
right owners."'
The section 512 liability protection regime, therefore, requires courts
to characterize a service provider's activity before determining which
safe harbor applies. The court's characterization will shape the outcome
of the litigation, since the availability of monetary damages, injunctive
relief and section 512(h) infringer-identification subpoenas all depend on
it. Despite the importance of characterization, Congress provided little
guidance of courts, either in section 512 itself or in the legislative his-
tory. Section 512(n) explicitly states that the safe harbors of
section 512(a)-(d) apply independently of each other; a particular entity
may qualify for safe harbor under all, some, or none of the subsections,
based solely on the criteria within each subsection.' Congress clearly
anticipated that particular service providers would engage in activity that
would implicate several of the safe harbors:
Section 512's limitations on liability are based on functions, and
each limitation is intended to describe a separate and distinct
function. Consider, for example, a service provider that provides
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (h), (j); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
177. See discussion supra Part II.A.v.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (h), (j); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
179. See discussion supra Part II.A.ii.
180. See discussion supra Parts II.A.iii-v.
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(n).
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a hyperlink to a site containing infringing material which it then
caches on its system in order to facilitate access to it by its users.
This service provider is engaging in at least three functions that
may be subject to the limitation on liability: transitory digital
network communications under subsection (a), system caching
under subsection (b), and information locating tools under sub-
section (d).'12
Despite clearly anticipating the overlapping effect of the safe
harbors, Congress made no provision for resolving ambiguity regarding
characterization of activities, beyond implying that the plaintiff's
characterization of the activity in the complaint will determine which
safe harbor applies.'"
C. A Rejected Alternative: House Bill 2281 Section 202
The elaborate characterization scheme in section 512 does far more
than codify Netcom. The legislative history of section 512 demonstrates
that Congress intended to extend protection to ISPs beyond that offered
in Netcom.1a Congress considered and rejected the option of simply
adopting the Netcom rule shielding ISPs from direct liability for passive
or automatic transmission of messages but leaving open the possibility
of contributory or vicarious liability.85 Statements in the House Report
indicating that section 512 "essentially codifies the result in the leading
and most thoughtful judicial decision to date: [Netcom]" refer to lan-
guage not included in the DMCA as finally passed.86 The House Report
on the DMCA, House Report 551, instead, refers to the text of the ver-
sion of section 512 that passed the House:
a) LIMITATION- Notwithstanding the provisions of [17 U.S.C.]
section 106, a provider shall not be liable for-
(1) direct infringement, based solely on the intermediate storage
and transmission of material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for that provider, if-
(A) the transmission was initiated by another person;
182. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 65 (1998).
183. Id. (suggesting that details of complaint determine applicability of individual safe
harbors).
184. For an extended treatment of the legislative history of the DMCA, see David Nim-
mer, Appreciating Legislative History The Sweet And Sour Spots Of The DMCA's
Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002).
185. See discussion infra Part I.C.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1 at 11, 24-26 (1998).
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(B) the storage and transmission is carried out through an auto-
matic technological process, without any selection of that
material by the provider; and
(C) no copy of the material thereby made by the provider is
maintained on the provider's system or network in a manner or-
dinarily accessible to anyone other than the recipients
anticipated by the person who initiated the transmission, and no
such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to such recipients for a longer period than
is reasonably necessary for the transmission;
(2) monetary relief under section 504 or 505 for contributory in-
fringement or vicarious liability, based solely on conduct
described in paragraph (1).
3) monetary relief under section 504 or 505 for contributory in-
fringement or vicarious liability, based solely on transmitting or
providing access to material over that provider's system or net-
work, other than conduct described in paragraph (1), if the
provider-
(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material is infring-
ing or, in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
ent; and
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, if the provider has the right and ability to
control such activity. 187
In this form, the bill lacks most of the features of the final version of
section 512, including:
(1) the quadripartite characterization system contained in sec-
tion 512(a)-(d);'88
(2) the bifurcated definitions of service provider contained in sec-
tion 512(k)(1);'89
187. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 202 (1998).
188. Compare H.R, 2281 § 202(a) (describing service provider liability protection with-
out reference to characterization beyond single category of "intermediate storage and
transmission"), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2002) (defining section 512 safe harbors and
requiring characterization of activity).
189. Compare H.R. 2281 § 202(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1).
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(3) infringer-identification subpoenas available under section
512(h);' 90 and
(4) the limitations on injunctive relief imposed in section
512(j). 191
Equally importantly, the version of the bill described in the House
Report distinguishes between direct liability and contributory infringe-
ment and vicarious liability.'9 2 In section 512(a)(1) of that version,
service providers were shielded from all liability for direct infringement
when they automatically stored or transmitted others' messages without
selecting their content, provided that they do not retain a copy of the
message. 93 Section 512(a)(2) of that version shielded them from mone-
tary liability for contributory infringement or vicarious liability, subject
to the same conditions.' 94 This explicit distinction between direct liability
and contributory or vicarious liability is not present in section 512 as
finally passed.
95
The House Report refers to section 512(a)(1) as a shield from direct
infringement and section 512(a)(2) as a shield from contributory and
vicarious infringement; the final version of section 512 does not address
these issues in these sections-and does not mention contributory or vi-
carious infringement at all. The version reported in the House includes
these provisions in the appropriate sections, making it evident that the
House Report's comments concern a version of section 512 that Con-
gress considered and rejected. 96
The House Report is therefore of extremely limited value in deter-
mining Congress's final intent in enacting section 512, since it
comments on a text never adopted into law.1 97 Section 512's protections
for ISPs--especially the quasi-common carrier protections offered in
section 512(a)--extend beyond the Netcom rule barring direct liability.
Other provisions, such as section 512(b)-(d) may leave open the possi-
bility of contributory liability but they are more extensive than the
protection offered by House Bill 2281, the mere codification of Netcom
that Congress considered and rejected.'9
190. Compare H.R. 2281 § 202(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
191. Compare H.R. 2281 § 202(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
192. See H.R. 2281 § 202(a).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
196. Compare H.R. 2281 § 202(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 512.
197. See H.R. 2281 § 202(a).
198. See discussion supra Part H.B.
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In its final form, section 512(a) provides ISPs with robust protection
from monetary liability for end users' infringement, freedom from sec-
tion 512(h) subpoenas, and limitations on the injunctive relief available
to copyright owners. The section 512(a) safe harbor, however, is only
available if courts are willing to characterize the ISP's activity as section
512(a) transmission or routing as opposed to section 512(c) storage of
information at the direction of a user which lacks such robust protection.
Part II will argue that courts have had difficulty characterizing particular
ISP activities and have therefore struggled to apply section 512 consis-
tently with Congress's intent.
III. CHARACTERIZATION: DEFINING AN ISP's ACTIVITY
AND EXPOSURE TO LIABILITY
Given the limited direction available, courts have not found a
consistent standard for characterizing particular Internet activities.
Characterization of an activity will often determine the outcome of a
claim against a service provider since bringing an activity into the
section 512(a) safe harbor excludes consideration of ISP knowledge of
infringing activity, bars section 512(h) subpoenas, and limits injunctive
relief under section 512(j).' 99 The section 512 (b), (c), and (d) safe
harbors impose none of these restrictions.20 The exclusion of
consideration of the ISP's level of knowledge is particularly important
because courts have reached widely varying conclusions regarding the
level of knowledge that constitutes a "red flag" that allows a plaintiff to
establish that an ISP has constructive knowledge of infringement on the
part of a user.20 ' Usenet-the mutual message-forwarding network whose
technical characteristics are discussed supra Part I.B.ii-is a particularly
appropriate case study for examining courts' difficulty in characterizing
particular activities according to the section 512 categories. First, the
technical characteristics of Usenet allow it, under certain circumstances,
to satisfy the requirements of each of the section 512(a), (b), and (c) safe
harbors. Second, Federal courts have already characterized it as both a
section 512(a) service and a section 512(c) service.20 2 Part III.A will
199. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
200. See discussion supra Part II.B.
201. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
202. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 E Supp.
1361, 1372-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (establishing principle of limited liability for ISPs and in-
cluding analysis of ISP's knowledge in evaluation of liability), and ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ
Communities, Inc., 239 E3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (characterizing Usenet service offered
by Usenet specialist provider as section 512(c) activity with knowledge element), with Ellison
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outline Usenet's technical characteristics and argue that these
characteristics allow Usenet arguably to fit into several of section 512's
categories. Part III.B will argue that the 4th Circuit incorrectly
characterized an ISP's participation in Usenet as a section 512(c) activity
in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.23 and that the District
Court for the Central District of California correctly characterized it as a
section 512(a) activity in Ellison v. Robertson.2 4
A. Usenet's Technical Characteristics and Section 512
Characterizing activity on the Internet according to the categories
provided in section 512 is a difficult task at a purely factual level. Usenet
is particularly difficult to characterize because it is an early example of
distributed peer-to-peer networking, but one in which ISPs (and in some
cases, other service providers) own and control the computers that par-
ticipate in the peer-to-peer network .2 1 Usenet's peer-to-peer architecture
reduces demands on long-distance transmission capacity by distributing
messages throughout the network of servers so that end users can re-
trieve any message directly from a local server without consuming long-distnce ransissin .206
distance transmission capacity. Its peer-to-peer architecture also means
that no single server exercises control over Usenet as a whole; there is no
central authority.
207
Usenet, therefore, possesses technical characteristics that allow
courts to characterize it as section 512(a) transitory network communica-
tions-if the service provider in question meets the section 512(k)(1)(A)
definition required to qualify for section 512(a) protection-section
512(b) system caching, or section 512(c) information residing on sys-
tems at the discretion of users.
Usenet fits the requirements of the section 512(a) safe harbor in that:
(1) end users initiate transmission of Usenet messages; and
(2) Usenet servers forward end-user-initiated messages according
to automated technical processes without specific selection of
the content of the messages; and
v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (characterizing Usenet service offered by
ISP as section 512(a) activity without knowledge element).
203. ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 619.
204. Ellison, 189 F. Supp.2d at 1051. Mr. Ellison has appealed the District Court's grant
of summary judgment to AOL to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oral arguments took place March 6, 2003. See Ellison v. AOL, Inc., No. 02-55797 (9th Cir.
argued Mar. 6, 2003).
205. See WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Usenet, at http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Usenet (last updated Dec 3, 2003) (characterizing Usenet as peer-to-peer application).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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(3) recipient end users request the messages they wish to read;
and
(4) ISPs' Usenet servers store end users' messages for only a lim-
ited time; and
(5) ISPs generally do not modify the content of end users' mes-
208
sages.
Though no court has yet raised the possibility, Usenet also fits the
requirements of the section 512(b) safe harbor since:
(1) the mutual message forwarding system requires the "interme-
diate and temporary storage of material [newsgroup postings]
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider";
(2) end users initiate transmission of Usenet messages;
(3) Usenet messages reach end users of many other ISPs; and
(4) ISPs retain copies of Usenet messages through an automatic
technical process for the purpose of making the messages
available to their end users.' 9
While Congress appears to have drafted section 512(b) on the as-
sumption that it would primarily apply to so-called "web caches" the
provision is drafted in general terms and does not exclude ISP activity
that creates local caches for material distributed using other networking
protocols.2 °
Usenet also fits the broader requirements of the section 512(c) safe
harbor-"[(1)] storage [(2)] at the direction of a user [(3)] of material
[(4)] that resides on a system or network [(5)] controlled or operated by
or for the service provider" '21- in that:
(1) ISPs' Usenet servers retain end users' messages for some pe-
riod of time; such retention could be characterized as
"storage"; and
(2) end users initiate the messages; and
208. See discussion supra Part I.B.iii.
209. See discussion supra Part I.B.iii.
210. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 42-43 (1998) (combining general references to caching
technology with specific references to "popular sites" and "originating sites"). For additional
discussion of web caching technology, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
211. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2002) (numbering added for clarity of reference).
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(3) end users' messages may include material that infringes copy-
right and
(4) retention of these messages as part of the forwarding process
will lead the material in the messages to reside on a system-
the Usenet server;212 and
(5) ISPs' Usenet servers will either fall under their control or be
operated for their benefit.
'13
The text of section 512 provides no particular criteria for determin-
ing which characterization is correct, though the section 512(a) safe
harbor is only available to "[entities] offering the transmission, routing,
or providing of connections for digital online communications, between
or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing,
without modification to the content of the material as sent or received, 21 4
a definition that will apply to ISPs as well as to other communications
service providers. Congress' intent to increase the level of liability pro-
tection available to ISPs beyond that offered by the Netcom doctrine,
however, provides strong support for the proposition that courts should
apply the section 512(a) safe harbor to any activity that might be charac-
terized as subject either to section 512(a) or section 512(c). If any
activity that may be characterized as section 512(a) activity or section
512(c) activity is subject only to section 512(c)'s limited protection,
Congress's clear intent to extend protection to ISPs beyond Netcom's
limited bounds will be frustrated."5
B. The Legal Dispute Over Characterization of Usenet
Two post-DMCA cases have characterized ISP participation in the
Usenet message-forwarding system under section 512: ALS Scan2 ' 6 and
Ellison."7 In ALS Scan, the Fourth Circuit characterized providing Use-
net service to end users as a section 512(c) activity; in Ellison, a Federal
212. See discussion supra Part I.B.iii. Even if the materials do not "reside" on a system,
the inclusion of a "network" as a potential location for user-initiated material to reside makes
it likely that Usenet will satisfy this element of the section 512(c) safe harbor.
213. See discussion supra Part I.B.iii. Many ISPs outsource Usenet services to specialty
Usenet providers; these providers give ISPs' end users direct access to a Usenet server oper-
ated by the specialty provider. These servers may be collocated with servers belonging to the
ISP and both parties may share administrative roles on the server; such arrangements would
satisfy all elements of the "controlled or operated by or for the service provider" language.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(l)(A) (2002).
215. See discussion supra Parts 11.B, II.C.
216. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
217. Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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District Court characterized it as a section 512(a) activity. 2  The ALS
Scan court relied on the superseded House Report on the version of sec-
tion 512 that Congress considered and rejected and therefore drew the
mistaken conclusion that section 512 merely codified Netcom.2 '9 Ellison,
however, applies section 512 consistently with Congress's intent and
characterizes Usenet service as a section 5 12(a) activity subject to all the
robust liability protections Congress intended to provide to ISPs.
220
i. ALS Scan: Usenet as a Section 5 12(c) Activity
In ALS Scan, a copyright holder brought a copyright infringement
claim against a specialty Usenet service provider, RemarQ.22' RemarQ
provided Usenet service to end users and ISPs.2 22 RemarQ also partici-
pated as a peer in the Usenet peer-to-peer network, forwarding messages
to peer servers according to algorithms defined by RemarQ staff.223 Re-
marQ did not monitor or otherwise control content in any Usenet
224
newsgroup. It did, however, have the technical capacity to deny access
to particular newsgroups to particular users or to configure its servers to
25
refuse messages from particular newsgroups or based on other criteria.
RemarQ stored incoming Usenet messages for "8-10 days" before delet-
ing them to conserve storage space.
226
Based on these facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that RemarQ's
provision of Usenet services fell under the section 512(c) safe harbor for
information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users
without meaningful discussion of how it reached its conclusion. 22' The
218. Compare Ellison, 189 F. Supp. at 1072, appeal docketed, No. 02-55797 (9th Cir.
argued Mar. 6, 2003) (applying section 512(a)), with ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 623 (applying
section 512(c)).
219. See ALS Scan 239 F.3d at 622 (referring to House Report explicating language
excluded from final version of section 512); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
220. See Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.19 (carefully vetting language of H.R. Rep.
No. 105-551, pt. I at 24 to determine Congressional intent).
221. ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 621. The Court characterized RemarQ as an "Internet service
provider" without tying that characterization to an assessment of RemarQ's compliance with
the section 512(k)(1)(A) requirements for eligibility for the section 512(a) safe harbor. Re-
marQ, now known as Supernews, remains active in the Usenet service outsourcing field; it
provides service both to individuals and to other ISPs. For further details, see Supernews
Company Information, at http://www.supemews.com/compinfo.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2003).
222. Als Scan, 239 F.3d at 621.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id. These technical capabilities are common to all peer participants in Usenet.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 623 ("The liability-limiting provision applicable here, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
.... .).
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court did not address the possibility that RemarQ might meet the section
512(k)(1)(A) requirements for safe harbor under section 512(a) or that
its Usenet services might qualify for section 512(a) safe harbor.2 ' Re-
marQ does not appear to have argued that it was entitled to section
512(a) safe harbor, choosing instead to seek section 512(c) safe harbor
by describing itself as a "'host' to persons and entities.,
29
The court's characterization of Usenet services as a section 512(c)
activity brought RemarQ's level of knowledge regarding users'
infringing activity and the adequacy of its response to ALS Scan's
notices into question, exposing RemarQ to contributory liability for mere
participation as a peer in Usenet's automated message-forwarding
system.230 ALS Scan did not allege infringement by any end users of
RemarQ's services or ISPs to whom it provided services.2 1' The court
reasoned, based on the superseded House Report, that section 512 as a
whole merely codified Netcom and that therefore RemarQ, like Netcom,
was shielded from direct liability for its passive or automatic acts but
might still be liable on a contributory theory if it had knowledge of the
infringement.2 2 The court reaches the same substantive result that
application of the Netcom rule would have produced, but it misses
Congress's intent to extend the protections of section 512 substantially
228. Id. The Fourth Circuit appears to miss the distinction between the section
512(k)(1)(A) requirements for section 512(a) safe harbor and the far less restrictive require-
ments of section 512(k)(1)(B) which apply to sections 512(b), (c), and (d). See id. at 623
(conflating section 512(k)(1)(B) and section 512(k)(1)(A) definitions of service provider, and
noting that neither side contests RemarQ's status as an "Interet service provider," without
specifying whether this RemarQ meets the section 512(k)(1)(A) requirements for section
512(a) safe harbor). Had the Fourth Circuit directly addressed the issue, it might have con-
cluded that RemarQ did not, in fact, meet the requirements of section 512(k)(1)(A) and was
therefore not entitled to the section 512(a) safe harbor. Research reveals no court that has yet
addressed the issue of specialist Usenet service providers' ability to avail themselves of the
section 512(a) safe harbor in a published decision. RemarQ, as a Usenet provider, is not as
easily defined as "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user" as, for example,
AOL or Verizon. RemarQ, however, since it merely provides access to Usenet servers which
forward end users' messages to other servers in the mutual message forwarding network,
could certainly argue that it is providing transmission and routing services to its users and
other service providers. Congress drafted the definition of service provider for section 512(a)
purposes in section 512(k)(l)(A) at a high level of abstraction and did not explicitly exclude
entities like RemarQ.
229. Appellant's Brief at 4, ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F3d 619
(4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1351), available at 2000 WL 33991307.
230. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F3d 619, 623 (4th Cir.
2001) (noting that sections 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) requirement that ISP lack actual or construc-
tive knowledge of infringing material or activity central to section 512(c) analysis).
231. Id. at 621.
232. See id. at 622 (citing language in H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. I indicating that sec-
tion 512 "essentially codifies [Netcom]").
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beyond the limits established in Netcom and embodied in the early
version the House Report describes.233
The Fourth Circuit bases its conclusion that section 512 merely codi-
fies Netcom on language from House Report 551, pt. 1, that stresses
service providers' exposure to contributory liability for automated
transmissions on the Netcom model; as demonstrated supra Part II.C,
this language refers to provisions of the then-pending bill that were su-
perseded by the final version of section 512(a) and is therefore
irrelevant.2'3 The court also cites House Conference Report 796,235 the
Conference Committee Report on the final version of the DMCA, but the
page cited includes only the unhelpful statement that "Title II preserves
strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooper-
ate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the
digital networked environment.' 23 6 So general a statement of Congress's
intent provides very little basis for the court's characterization of partici-
pation in Usenet as a section 512(c) activity, with all the exposure to
liability that characterization creates, especially given the very next sen-
tence in the Conference Committee Report: "At the same time, [section
512] provides greater certainty to service providers concerning their le-
gal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their
activities. 237
ii. Ellison: Usenet as a Section 512(a) Activity
In Ellison, Harlan Ellison, a noted science fiction writer, brought
copyright infringement claims against several providers of Usenet ser-
vices, including AOL and RemarQ. 238 The claims against the ISPs were
233. See id. at 622 (noting that "the ultimate conclusion on [the direct infringement]
point is controlled by Congress's codification of the Netcom principles in Title II of the
DMCA").
234. Id. at 622 (discussion of legislative history of DMCA referring to superseded ver-
sion of section 512(a)); see also discussion supra Part II.C. This language appears in a section
immediately preceding the court's analysis of RemarQ's exposure to liability under section
512; while directly addressed at refuting plaintiff's claim that RemarQ was liable for direct
infringement under the Frena doctrine entirely rejected in the DMCA, it provides important
background regarding the court's general assumptions regarding ISPs' liability for users' activ-
ity that infringes copyright.
235. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796 (1998).
236. H.R. CONE. REP. No. 105-796, at 72; see also ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625 (citing
H.R. CON . REP. No. 105-796, at 72).
237. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72.
238. See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F Supp. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (C.D. Cal. 2002); re-
manded for further fact-finding on other grounds, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 2004) (remanding
for fact-finding regarding AOL's satisfaction of section 512(i) threshold requirements for sec-
tion 512(a)-(d) safe harbors but explicitly adopting District Court's characterization of Usenet
as section 512(a) activity).
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based solely on their role in automatically forwarding allegedly infring-
ing Usenet messages to other participants in the Usenet network.239
Plaintiff later dismissed RemarQ from the case, but RemarQ's activi-
ties-participating as a peer in Usenet's automated message-forwarding
network-were identical to the activities at issue in ALS Scan.2 ° AOL's
participation in the Usenet network was functionally identical to Re-
marQ's activities in ALS Scan except that AOL retained Usenet messages
with binary content" on its servers for "approximately fourteen days. 242
The Ellison court, in contrast to the Fourth Circuit, characterized
AOL's participation as a peer in the Usenet message-forwarding system
as "transitory digital network communications" entitled to safe harbor
under section 512(a).243 In doing so, the court concluded that the thresh-
old requirements of section 512(k)(1)(A) limiting eligibility for section
512(a) safe harbor to "[entities] offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing,
without modification to the content of the material as sent or received"
merely restated the substantive provisions of section 512(a), allowing it
to bypass an extensive discussion of AOL's status as a section
512(k)(1)(A) service provider.2" The court found that AOL's participa-
tion as a peer in Usenet met all the elements of the section 512(a) safe
harbor:
(1) other persons initiated transmission of the messages;24 and
(2) AOL played no role in selecting the infringing material for
distribution;2" and
(3) AOL played no role in selecting the recipients of the mate-
rial ;247 and
239. See id.
240. See id. at 1055 (noting settlement between plaintiff and RemarQ).
241. Binary content includes graphics files, audio files, motion picture files, and com-
piled computer programs, among other categories. Many Usenet peer servers retain messages
with binary content for shorter periods of time than text messages because they occupy more
storage space on the server.
242. Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
243. Id. at 1067-68.
244. See id. at 1068. In practical terms, however, it is difficult to imagine that AOL
would not qualify as a service provider under section 512(k)(l)(A) under any circumstances
where it was providing access to Internet resources as opposed to its own proprietary re-
sources.
245. See id. at 1071.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 1071-72.
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(4) AOL stored the messages for only fourteen days, no longer
that was "reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing,
or provision of connections;,24' and
(5) AOL did not modify the content of the messages.24 9
The court rejected Ellison's claim that the automated filtering rules
that AOL had applied-it is the rare ISP that carries every single Usenet
newsgroup, and AOL certainly did not-constituted "selection of the
material" under section 512(a)(2) 5° The court reasoned that if automatic
filtering barred ISPs from the section 512(a) safe harbor, ISPs would be
forced either to abandon their filtering practices-and therefore carry
newsgroups for which there was no end user demand as well as news-
groups devoted to criminal practices like child pornography and
prostitution-or abandon their section 512(a) liability protection.'
Given Congress's oft-expressed concern with protecting minors from
illegal obscene content online, the court refused to require ISPs to for-
ward patently criminal messages in order to retain their section 512(a)
safe harbor.
52
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied to some extent on House
Report 551, pt. 1, though it noted the substantial differences between the
text examined in the House Report and the final text of section 512.253
The court limited its reliance on the House Report to determining that
Congress intended section 512(a)(4) to allow ISPs to store material for
whatever period of time-even two weeks, as in this case-might be
254reasonably necessary for transmission .
The court based this conclusion on the fact that both the earlier ver-
sion of section 512 described in the House Report and the final version
of section 512 used the language exempting service providers from li-
ability when they transmit or route communications and "no
[intermediate] copy is maintained on the [service provider's] system or
248. See id. at 1070 (discussing retention of messages in context of the eleven-day reten-
tion period in Netcom and Congress's intent expressed in H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, pt. I at p. 24
to adopt the holding in Netcom). See discussion supra Part II.C for an extensive discussion of
the limitations of this report as a source of legislative history of the DMCA.
249. See Ellison, 189 F Supp. 2d at 1072.
250. See id. at 1071 (holding that service provider's selection of newsgroups to carry
does not qualify as selection of material under section 512(a)(2)).
251. Id. (noting that economic and police power interests support interpretation of sec-
tion 512(a) that allows ISPs to engage in automated selection of Usenet traffic for forwarding).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1069 (noting discrepancy between text analyzed in House Report and final
text and commenting on difficulties of using superseded legislative history).
254. See id. (detailing analysis of House Report's commentary on analogous language
from superseded version of section 512).
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network ... for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission., 255 The court reasoned that if this language remained in the
final version of section 512, the House Report's assertion that Congress
intended this language to mean that "intermediate copies may be re-
tained without liability for only a limited period of time" remained
256
relevant. The court also concluded that if the House Report remained
relevant on this issue, then its assertion that Netcom defined the limits of
"a limited period of time" for section 512 purposes also remained rele-
vant.257 Based on these premises, the court finally concluded that if
eleven days' storage qualified as a limited period of time under Netcom's
facts, then AOL's fourteen-day retention period must meet section
5 12(a)(4)'s Netcom-derived standard.258
The Ellison court read section 512's legislative history correctly. 2 9 In
contrast to the ALS Scan court, it carefully determined which elements of
the legislative history related to language that entered the final version of
the statute and ignored elements of the legislative history concerning
versions of the statute that Congress considered and rejected.2W The
Ninth Circuit recently remanded the case to the District Court for further
fact-finding on the issue of AOL's compliance with section 512(i)'s
threshold requirements for the section 512(a)-(d) safe harbors . In do-
ing so, the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted the District Court's section
512(a) characterization, stating that:
If after remand a jury finds AOL to be eligible under section
5 12(i) to assert the safe harbor limitations of sections 512(a-d),
the parties need not relitigate whether AOL qualifies for the
limitation of liability provided by section 512(a); the district
255. Compare H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 202(a) (1998), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4)
(2002).
256. Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1070, citing H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at p. 24 ("By
referring to temporary storage of copies, Netcom recognizes implicitly that intermediate cop-
ies may be retained without liability for only a limited period of time. The requirement in
paragraph 512(a)(1) that 'no copy [be] maintained on the system or network ... for a longer
period than reasonably necessary for the transmission' is drawn from the facts of the Netcom
case, and is intended to codify this implicit limitation in the Netcom holding.
257. Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
258. See id..
259. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
260. Compare Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F Supp. 2d 1051, 1069-70 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(carefully separating superseded elements of House Report from elements that retain rele-
vance), with ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 662 (4th Cir. 2001)
(accepting language in House Report stating that version of section 512 that Congress consid-
ered and rejected merely codified Netcom).
261. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
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court's resolution of that issue at the summary judgment stage is
sound.262
iii. Ellison's Section 512(a) Characterization is More
Consistent with Congress's Intent
The Ellison court's characterization of AOL's participation in Usenet
as section 512(a) transmission or routing is more consistent with Con-
gress' intent in adopting section 512 than is the Fourth Circuit's
characterization in ALS Scan of RemarQ's participation in the same net-
work as storage of material at the direction of a user subject to section
512(c). 263 The Fourth Circuit erred by accepting as authoritative language
in the House Report that refers to a version of section 512 that Congress
considered and rejected before passing section 512 in its final form. The
Fourth Circuit, misled by the superseded legislative history, therefore
ignored the stronger protections for transmission and routing activity that
Congress inserted into section 512 after the House Report was com-
plete.26
Instead of applying section 512's statutory safe harbor scheme, the
Fourth Circuit chose to treat section 512 as a mere codification of Net-265
com. As extensively demonstrated above, section 512's text and the
legislative history of its final form strongly support the conclusion that it
is a substantial extension of Netcom.266 The Fourth Circuit ignored sec-
tion 512's characterization scheme in favor of mechanical application of
Netcom; in doing so, the court may have served the interests of judicial
economy-section 512's interdependent provisions are not easy to
parse-but it misread both the text and the legislative history of section
512 267
The Ellison court, by contrast, understood that section 512's nested
scheme of safe harbors provided substantially greater protection from
liability to ISPs than did Netcom.266 It applied the statute as written, with
proper reference to the small sections of the House Report which had not
been rendered irrelevant by revisions in section 512.269 Most importantly,
the court took seriously Congress's decision to create in section 512(a) a
262. Id.
263. See discussion supra Parts III.Bi, III.B.ii.
264. See discussion supra Parts 11.C, lI.Bi.
265. See discussion supra Parts I.B, lI.Bi.
266. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C.
267. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.B.i.
268. See discussion supra Part IfI.B.ii; see also Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F Supp. 2d
1051, 1064-72 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (extensively discussing AOL's compliance with statutory
requirements of section 512(a) safe harbor).
269. See discussion supra Part III.B.iii.
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quasi-common carrier safe harbor for entities that transmit and rout mes-
sages on the Internet.2 '0 The Ellison court was therefore correct when it
characterized an ISP's participation in the Usenet network as transmis-
sion or routing activity entitled to the section 512(a) safe harbor.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Courts' inconsistent characterization of Usenet in ALS Scan and Elli-
son shows the importance of characterization of ISPs' activity in
determining the outcome of copyright infringement claims. A court's
characterization of an ISP's activity for section 512 purposes will deter-
mine:
(1) the availability of monetary relief for contributory infringe-
ment;
27
(2) the availability of section 512(h) intruder-identification sub-
poenas;272 and
(3) the extent of injunctive relief available to the plaintiff.273
In each of these areas, the ISP benefits greatly if the court character-
izes its activity as transmission or routing shielded by section 512(a)'s
quasi-common-carrier protections. The copyright owner, for its part, is
substantially more likely to prevail-and to gain the monetary damages
and broad injunctive relief it seeks-if the court characterizes the ISP's
activity as storage at the direction of a user entitled only to the section
512(c) safe harbor.
While Usenet is an interesting case study that reveals the importance
of characterization for section 512 purposes, the characterization issue is
likely to arise in cases that seek to hold ISPs and other service providers
liable for providing access to other peer-to-peer networks. Kazaa, Grok-
ster, and Gnutella are prominent examples of peer-to-peer networks. 7 4 If
providing access to these networks qualifies as section 512(a) transmis-
sion or routing, then ISPs are not liable on either direct or contributory
theories for infringing activity over these networks. If, however, courts
270. See discussion supra Parts ILB, I.B.ii-iii]; see also Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at
1054-55 (discussing implications of section 512(a)-(d) statutory safe harbors).
271. See discussion supra Parts IA, I.B.
272. See discussion supra Parts I.A.vi, I.B.
273. See discussion supra Parts II.A.vii, lI.B.
274. Details of these second-generation peer-to-peer technologies are provided in Metro-
Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-33 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (detailing technical characteristics of peer-to-peer technologies).
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define these activities as "storage at the direction of a user" "on a system
or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider" gov-
erned by section 5 12(c), the ISP may be liable on a contributory theory if
it had actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing material or ac-
tivity.
The court's characterization of the activity in question, therefore,
will shape the entire development of the litigation.27 Part IV.A will argue
that ISPs are very likely to prevail in litigation if the court characterizes
the activity in question as transmission or routing subject to the section
512(a) safe harbor. Part IV.B will argue that uncertainty regarding courts'
characterization of particular activities will have a chilling effect on
ISPs' willingness to support-or even tolerate-the emergence of new
networking technologies. Part IV.C will urge courts to take ISP activity
characterization seriously and to allow ISPs to avail themselves of the
section 512(a) transmission and routing safe harbor when appropriate.
A. Legal Consequences
If courts adopt the ALS Scan analysis and conclude that participation
in Usenet-or other similar mutual message forwarding systems-is
section 512(c) storage at the direction of a user in order to reach a sub-
stantive result analogous to the outcome in Netcom, ISPs:
(1) will be exposed to contributory liability for any Usenet mes-
sage that infringes copyright if they have actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement;
76
(2) will be required to comply with section 512(h) infringer-
identification subpoenas ;277 and
(3) will be subject to a broad range of injunctive relief under sec-
tion 5 12(j)(1)(A).278
By contrast, if courts adopt the Ellison analysis, defining participa-
tion in Usenet or similar systems as section 512(a) transmission or
routing, ISPs:
(1) will be preserved from all monetary liability for Usenet users'
copyright infringement, regardless of their level of knowl-
edge 9
275. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
276. See discussion supra Parts I.A, 1l.B.
277. See discussion supra Parts IAvi, ll.B.
278. See discussion supra Parts ll.A.vii, II.B.
279. See discussion supra Parts H.A.ii, II.B.
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(2) will not be subject to section 512(h) infringer-identification
subpoenas;2'° and
(3) will benefit from strict limits on injunctive relief under sec-
tion 512(j)(1)(B). 8
The most important consequence of a court's characterization deci-
sion is that section 512(a) shields an ISP from contributory liability for
its activity while section 512(c) does not. 2 The outcome in Ellison dem-
onstrates this distinction clearly. Since section 512(a) does not include a
knowledge element, the court found that AOL was shielded from all li-
ability for copyright infringement, regardless of its knowledge or lack
thereof regarding the particular infringement in question even though
plaintiff had raised issues of material fact regarding AOL's actual knowl-
edge of the infringements in question.2 3 This outcome demonstrates
section 512(a)'s ability to shield ISPs from contributory-in addition to
direct-liability for users' copyright infringement.M
By contrast, section 512(c)'s safe harbor is only available if an ISP
has neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the infringement. 28 As
the ALS Scan court put it, "[section 512(c)] immunity, however, is not
presumptive, but granted only to 'innocent' service providers who can
prove they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringe-
ment, as defined under the three prongs of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)., 28 6 An
ISP will lose its section 512(c) safe harbor by failing to prove its "inno-
cence" of the infringement long before a copyright holder can establish
the knowledge element of its contributory infringement claim.2 8 7 ALS
Scan provides an example of this limitation of the section 512(c) safe
harbor.2 8 ALS Scan's notification of claimed infringement and allega-
tions that RemarQ had actual knowledge of particular infringements of
280. See discussion supra Parts nl.A.vi, l.B.
281. See discussion supra Parts II.A.vii, II.B. ISPs, of course, can only avail themselves
of section 512(a)'s robust protection if they meet section 512(k)(1)(A)'s threshold definition of
service provider.
282. See discussion supra Part II.A.ii.
283. See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1071-72 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding
AOL protected from monetary liability under section 512(a)); id. at 1059 (finding that plaintiff
has raised material question of fact regarding AOL's willful ignorance of infringements in
question).
284. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2002).
286. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
287. See id. at 625-26 (holding that service provider that could not prove ignorance of
infringement was not entitled to section 512(c) safe harbor while expressing doubts about
copyright owner's prospects of proving knowledge element of contributory infringement).
288. See id.
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ALS Scan copyrights were enough to deny RemarQ access to the section
512(c) safe harbor but not enough to hold it liable as a contributory in-
fringer.' 9 In any case where a plaintiff can establish the knowledge
element of contributory infringement, section 512(c) is unlikely to pro-
vide a shield from liability, since the ISP's knowledge will deny it safe
harbor under either section 512(c)(1)(A)(i) or section 512(c)(l)(A)(ii).2'9
It is therefore an uncertain shield against claims of contributory in-
fringement.
The court's characterization of ISP activity will also determine
whether section 512(h) infringer-identification subpoenas are available
to copyright owners. 29' Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.292
v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., the only published Federal appellate
decision to address the issue, establishes a simple rule: section 512(h)
subpoenas are available if the ISP engages in section 512(b) system
caching, section 512(c) storage at the direction of a user, or section
512(d) provision of information location tools, but not for section 512(a)
transmission and routing.293 Under this rule, if a court characterizes an
activity as section 512(a) transmission or routing, a copyright owner
must file a claim-and not merely allege copyright infringement-in
order to gain access to the court's subpoena power.294 Under these cir-
cumstances, ISPs are likely to be subject to substantially smaller
subpoena-compliance burdens if their activity fits the section 512(a) safe
harbor than if it falls into section 512(c).
289. See id.
290. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2002); see also discussion supra Part II.A.iv.
Research revealed no published case in which a court has ruled on this issue when an ISP is
involved. Courts which have denied non-ISP service providers the section 512(c) safe harbor
have preferred instead to focus on shortcomings of the providers' compliance with section
512(i)'s threshold requirements for any of the safe harbors or with the notice requirements of
section 512(c). See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1175-81 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing at length age verification service provider's failure to
comply with section 512(c) and (i) requirements); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F
Supp. 2d 688, 703-04 (D. Md. 2001) (declining to extend section 512(c) safe harbor to web
hosting service on grounds that material questions of fact exist regarding its section 512(c) and
(i) compliance).
291. See discussion supra Part II.A.vi.
292. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
293. Id. at 1236.
294. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(l)(B) (requiring that subpoena state title of pending ac-
tion); see also, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-42 (1950) ("Federal
judicial power itself extends only to adjudication of cases and controversies and it is natural
that its investigative powers should be jealously confined to these ends.").
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Finally, the court's characterization of ISP activity will determine the
extent of injunctive relief available to the copyright owner.9  If the court
characterizes the activity as section 512(a) transmission or routing, sec-
tion 512(j)(1)(B) limits injunctive relief to an order to terminate the
direct infringer's account or block access to a specific online location
outside U.S. jurisdiction.296 If the activity falls into the section 512(c)
safe harbor, the copyright owner faces much looser limits on the injunc-
tive relief available.297
Taken together, these legal disadvantages place an ISP whose activi-
ties are accorded only the section 512(c) safe harbor in a difficult
position. Because the ISP's level of knowledge of the infringing activity
remains relevant to assessing liability, the ISP is subject to expensive and
intrusive discovery aimed at its officers and employees.299 In addition, the
ISP has very little guidance regarding what sort of actual or constructive
knowledge will defeat its section 512(c) safe harbor under sec-
tion 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). An ISP would have to feel confident indeed
to put itself to the test under the proof of innocence standard the Fourth
Circuit enunciated in ALS Scan. Under these circumstances, an ISP is
far less likely to prevail against a claim of copyright infringement if the
court characterizes its activity as section 512(c) storage than if it quali-
fies as section 512(a) transmission or routing.""
B. Practical Consequences
The practical consequences of uncertainty over ISP access to the ro-
bust quasi-common-carrier protection of the section 512(a) transmission
and routing safe harbor are substantial. First, exposure to monetary li-
ability, section 512(h) subpoenas, and extensive injunctive relief may
induce an ISP to settle a case if it fears that it will only benefit from the
section 512(c) safe harbor. RemarQ appears to have made exactly this
calculation in Ellison.°1 In exchange for Mr. Ellison's agreement to drop
295. See discussion supra Part II.A.vii.
296. See discussion supra Part II.A.vii.
297. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A) (2002); see also discussion supra Part II.A.vii.
298. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir.
2001) (remanding case to District Court for "further development of the record" on purpose of
particular newsgroups identified in ALS Scan's notification).
299. See ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625 (holding that section 512(c) safe harbor "granted
only to 'innocent' providers who can prove they do not have actual or constructive knowledge
of the infringement, as defined under any of the three prongs of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)").
300. Compare Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F Supp. 2d 1051, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (ap-
plying section 512(a)), with ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 623 (applying section 512(c)).
301. See Ellison, 189 F Supp. 2d at 1055 (noting that Mr. Ellison dismissed RemarQ
from case on January 18, 2002). A somewhat disjointed press release narrating some of the
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the suit and to forego any claims for monetary damages, RemarQ agreed
to develop software that allowed Mr. Ellison to delete postings he judged
to be infringing and to provide access to an employee to assist him in
deleting the postings if necessary. 2 The settlement demonstrates Re-
marQ's concern that the section 512(c) safe harbor would not shield it
from liability; the terms of the settlement allow Mr. Ellison to exert some
degree of control over RemarQ's business and would be entirely un-
workable if they applied to every copyright owner.
3 0 3
Second, uncertainty regarding exposure to liability may affect ISPs'
willingness to tolerate the presence of new networking applications on
their networks or to forward others' messages. ISPs cannot be confident
that participation in automated message-forwarding networks like Use-
net or providing network resources that users use to connect to more
modern peer-to-peer networks will be characterized as section 512(a)
transitory digital network communications and not section 512(c) stor-
age of material on a system or network controlled or operated by the
iSP.
304
So far, only one Federal appellate court has held on the issue of
characterization of peer-to-peer networking systems for section 512 pur-
details of the case from the point of view of Mr. Ellison's supporters is available at
http://harlanellison.com/KICK/kickrls.htm. This account indicates that RemarQ had not
entered into settlement talks with Mr. Ellison before the Fourth Circuit decided ALS Scan. See
Press Release, Harlan Ellison and Critical Path, Inc. (Jan. 19, 2002), available at
http://harlanellison.com/KICK/crit rls.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
302. See id. The press release reads as follows:
The copyright infringement action filed by noted author and literary activist Harlan
Ellison against Critical Path, Inc. and its subsidiary RemarQ Communites, Inc. has
been settled. The action stemmed from the unauthorized posting of some of Elli-
son's most well-known copyrighted stories on the RemarQ service. Ellison's
copyright infringement action is continuing against the remaining defendant, Amer-
ica Online, Inc.
Among the terms of the settlement, Critical Path will develop software that allows
Ellison immediately to delete unauthorized postings of his works of which he be-
comes aware. Critical Path will also appoint an employee to be available to Ellison
as a back up measure.
Ellison, who has authored 75 books in his distinguished career, noted: "I am
pleased to have settled this case with Critical Path and RemarQ and believe we have
taken a step forward for writers everywhere in their efforts to protect copyrighted
works."
The settlement did not include any admission of liability. Commenting on the set-
tlement, a Critical Path spokesperson said: "We are pleased to reach a settlement in
this case that will aid authors in protecting their intellectual property."
Id.
303. See id.
304. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2002).
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poses. In Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon
Internet Services, Inc," 5 the District Court of the District of Columbia
found that peer-to-peer networks running over an ISP's network quali-
fied as transitory digital network communications for section 512(a)
purposes.3 6 This characterization, however, came in the context of a the
court's refusal to allow section 512(h) infringer-identification subpoenas
to issue where an ISP's activities fall within the section 512(a) safe har-
bor and not in an assessment of an ISP's exposure to liability for a user's
copyright infringement.3 7 The decision also calls into question the con-
tinued applicability of Ellison's characterization of participation in
Usenet as section 512(a) transmission or routing. The court's rationale
for characterizing peer-to-peer file sharing by an ISP's users as section
512(a) transmission or routing rested on a bright line distinction between
"an ISP storing infringing material on its servers in any capacity"-
entitled to one of the section 512(b)-(d) safe harbors-and "an ISP rout-
ing infringing material to or from a personal computer owned and used
by a subscriber"--entitled to section 512(a) safe harbor."8 This bright
line rule is easier to administer than the complex analysis required in
Ellison, but it risks exposing an ISP to liability whenever infringing ma-
terial resides on a computer under its control long enough to be in
"storage."3" If other courts follow the Verizon court by excluding any
ISP activity that includes storage of files on ISP-owner equipment "in
any capacity," ISPs may be entitled only to the section 512(c) safe harbor
for participating in Usenet and similar message-forwarding systems that
involve temporary storage of messages on an ISP's servers.
In addition, the Verizon court's characterization of an ISP carrying
peer-to-peer networking traffic as subject to the section 512(a) safe har-
bor is not justified at any particular length in the decision.30 Other courts
have not yet reached the issue of ISP liability for carrying peer-to-peer
305. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 E3d 1229, 1233
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
306. See id. (characterizing ISP as "only ... a conduit for data transferred between two
[I]nternet users" and applying section 512(a) safe harbor in subsequent analysis).
307. See id. at 1236 (ruling that copyright holders are not entitled to section 512(h) sub-
poenas to identify users when ISP engaged in section 512(a) activities).
308. Id. at 1237.
309. Defining the period of "storage" required to place an ISP in the section 512(c) safe
harbor as opposed to section 512(a) will be difficult in any case, since section 512(a)'s safe
harbor includes protection for "intermediate and transient storage" 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c)
(2002). Ellison makes a reasonable argument that storage of material for up to fourteen days
can qualify as "intermediate and transient" under certain circumstances. See Ellison v. Robert-
son, 189 E Supp. 2d 1051, 1068-70 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also discussion supra Part III.B.ii.
310. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1233 (characterizing Verizon as "conduit for P2P file sharing"
entitled to section 512(a) safe harbor without further elaboration).
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file sharing traffic, but there is a realistic possibility that they will not
choose to follow Verizon on the issue, especially given copyright owners'
strong interest in convincing courts to characterize such activity as sec-
tion 512(c) storage at the direction of a user."' Copyright owners can
argue that the text of section 512(c)-referring to "material that resides
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service pro-
vider" [emphasis added]-supports such a characterization.
12
The Verizon court adopted the District Court's conclusion that
"[b]ecause peer-to-peer users most often swap materials over the Internet
that are stored on their own computers-not on the service providers'
networks-such activity is within subsection (a), not subsection (c)."'313
This characterization, however, is not essential to the District Court's
holding, since the District Court concluded that section 512(h) subpoe-
nas were available to copyright owners regardless of which section 512
safe harbor protected the ISP's activity.3'4 In addition, the District Court
ignored the possibility that information can reside on a network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service provider without residing on a
system controlled or operated by or for the service provider.35 The Dis-
trict Court treats information as resident on a service provider's network
only if it resides on a system under the service provider's control.3 ,6 This
interpretation renders the term "network" in section 512(c) superfluous,
violating a standard rule of statutory construction. The conclusion that
information residing on users' systems connected to a service provider's
network resides on the network is equally plausible and does not raise
the same difficulties of statutory construction as the District Court's in-
terpretation. Copyright owners can also plausibly argue that the Verizon
court's characterization thwarts Congress' intent in enacting section 512
by effectively shielding the vast majority of infringing communication
over the Internet from any action by copyright owners short of a legal
claim.3"7 Verizon's limited treatment of characterization has not disposed
of these arguments.
311. See discussion supra Part IV.A for an elaboration of the legal advantages that ac-
crue to a copyright owner if the court characterizes an ISP's activity as subject to the section
512(c) safe harbor.
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2002).
313. In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D. D.C. 2003).
314. See id. at 44.
315. See id. at 35.
316. See id.
317. For examples of this sort of argument, see In re Verizon, 240 F Supp. 2d at 36-39
(noting incongruity of shielding peer-to-peer file sharing from copyright owners' section
512(h) subpoena power).
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ISPs may choose to react to this uncertainty by reducing their expo-
sure through technical means. If ISPs do not know whether participation
in Usenet is entitled to the section 512(a) safe harbor, they may suspend
their participation in mutual message forwarding systems like Usenet, or
at least reduce the number of newsgroups which they carry in order to
avoid exposure to litigation. No ISP wishes to suffer the fate of RemarQ:
expensive legal defeat followed by rapid settlement of other claims. To
the extent that ISPs are unsure how courts will characterize other net-
working technologies, they will have an incentive to use bandwidth
management and security tools to prevent network activity associated
with networking technologies that may expose them to liability on their
networks."'
The easiest way to do so is by forbidding categories of traffic that
the ISP does not approve, a practice common on corporate networks."9
Newly-developed hardware and software tools allow networking profes-
sionals to monitor and prioritize particular categories of traffic. Some of
these tools, like the Packeteer PacketShaper32° and the Allot NetEn-
forcer,32" ' are intended primarily to allow networking professionals to
maximize the efficiency of traffic flow on their networks. Others, like the
Symantec Gateway Security appliance322 and the Check Point Enterprise
Suite with Floodgate-1323 combine traffic-management features with
highly-developed security-management tools. Widespread deployment of
these tools will slow development of new network applications; these
applications will fail, at least initially, to function at all.'
318. See, e.g., Julia King, Preventing P2P Abuse, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 8, 2003, at 52
(describing University of Florida's development of automated system to detect peer-to-peer
applications and disable network access for computers on which they reside); Parry Aftab,
What To Do Before The RIAA Knocks, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 6, 2003 (advising businesses
and universities to eliminate peer-to-peer applications from their networks to avoid liability).
319. Businesses and universities often deploy security devices known as firewalls to
protect their networks and monitor incoming and outgoing traffic. These devices and a new
category of device that prioritizes particular categories of traffic give organizations substantial
control over end users' ability to use particular networking applications.
320. Full details of Packeteer's products are available at http://www.packeteer.com/ (last
visited November 15, 2003).
321. Full details of Allot's products are available at http://www.allot.com/ (last visited
November 15, 2003).
322. Symantec provides details of the Gateway Security 5400 series at http:// enterprise-
security.symantec.comlproducts/products.cfm?ProductlD=133. Product cycles in the security
industry are sufficiently short that several generations of this category of product will have
come and gone before this Note reaches publication.
323. Check Point offers both hardware appliances and software products in this category.
Full details of their offerings are available at http://www.checkpoint.com/.
324. See, e.g., David Margulius, Blockers, spammers, and domain name overlords
threaten universal Internet connectivity, INFOWORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, at 42. Developers may
find means of circumventing network management tools, but their efforts will simply renew an
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If large ISPs implement this strategy throughout their networks in
order to reduce their exposure to liability-or for other reasons-they
will also convert their networks into immediate and automated mecha-
nisms of control. They will have a level of control over communication
and commerce that exceeds even Jeremy Bentham's dreams for the Pan-
opticon. In place of potential surveillance, they will impose immediate,
pervasive, and automated control. The settlement that RemarQ reached
in Ellison could extend to a service provider's entire network; copyright
owners would gain veto power over communication or at least convert
ISPs' networks into instrumentalities for preserving their rights 325
Some ISPs, including several academic institutions, have already in-
stituted such automated monitoring. The University of Florida, for
example, has created a software tool called ICARUS that monitors traffic
over its network, identifies traffic that appears to be characteristic of
peer-to-peer file sharing, and then suspends network service to the com-
puter generating the traffic for 30 minutes.326 Users may regain network
access only if they complete a 10-minute interactive presentation on
copyright law.12 ' As of November 22, 2003, the author of the tool had
received inquiries "from more than 110 universities, eight Internet ser-
vice providers and 23 companies" seeking information on how to deploy
similar monitoring and control solutions on their networks.32 The Joint
Committee of the Higher Education and Entertainment Communities,
composed of leaders from the higher education community and music
and motion picture industries, studied ICARUS as a potential solution
for controlling file sharing at other universities.329
Now that this level of fine-grained, automatic control over users'
communications is available to ISPs, the Internet is no longer an undif-
ferentiable cloud but an automated Panopticon. ISPs have the ability to
allow or disallow communications according to extremely sophisticated
rules with only a limited investment of time, money and effort. Section
arms race between network management development and novel application development.
The same cycle of repression and response occurs at a legal level. For a discussion of changes
in the development of peer-to-peer software in response to legal developments, see Timothy
Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VIRGINIA L. REv. 679 (2003).
325. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
326. See Ron Word, University's Software Kicks Off Downloaders, HOUSTON CHRONI-
CLE, Nov. 22, 2003, available at http://www.chron.com/ cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/tech/news/
2242112.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See Katie Dean, Florida Dorms Lock Out P2P Users, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 3, 2003,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60613,00.html (last visited Nov.
27, 2003). For further details on the Joint Committee of the Higher Education and Entertain-
ment Communities, see JCHEEC, Request For Information #2 Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.educause.edu/asp/faq/faq.asp?Code=RF2.
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512(a)'s quasi-common-carrier protection for transmission and routing
shields ISPs from copyright owners' pressure to convert their networks
into instrumentalities of monitoring and control.33 ° If placing this sort of
control in copyright owners hands is desirable, society should make that
decision openly and explicitly instead of allowing such pervasive control
to emerge from the messy legal struggle between ISPs and copyright
holders.
In the case of conventional telecommunications, society acted to bar
telecommunications providers from taking advantage of their control of
the instrumentalities of communication to control their users' behavior
by forbidding them to monitor or control communications and shielding
them from liability for communications over their networks."' Section
512(a) provides similar protections for Internet communications, shield-
ing ISPs from most liability for transmitting messages and users from
casual identification by copyright owners."' If society chooses to apply a
different regime to ISPs, that decision should only be made after careful
consideration. The historical accident that led to the emergence of the
confederation of networks that makes up the Internet has already pro-
vided enormous advantages to society; it would be tragic if the
transformative potential of Internet communications disappeared in an-
other historical accident.
Communications over the Internet should not be accorded a different
level of protection from monitoring simply because they are easier to
monitor. Judge Easterbrook's famous comment that there should no
more be a law of cyberspace than there is a law of the horse must cut
both ways.333 "Technological advances must continually be evaluated and
their relation to legal rules determined so that antiquated rules are not
misapplied in modem settings .... Yet, if the substance of a transaction
has not changed, new technology does not require a new legal rule
merely because of its novelty."3"
330. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
331. See discussion supra Part I.B.i.
332. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
333. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
334. Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 338 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1987).
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